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Abstract 
The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMSCA) stipulates Hours of 
Service (HOS) regulations in order to minimize or eliminate fatigued truck driving, a 
major cause of truck-related accidents.  This research examines the efficacy of HOS with 
three unique research approaches: 1) a typology classification model to indicate 
differences in HOS regulation from other safety regulations, 2) an exhaustive 
enumeration method utilizing the theoretical foundation of perishable inventory theory, 
and 3) a statistical analysis on accidents caused by or involving truck drivers.  This 
research provides insight into similar Air Force Instructions regarding flight-time 
restrictions for pilots, which attempt to prevent flying while fatigued.  This research 
demonstrates that these types of restrictions do not directly measure fatigue and that they 
are subject to various unintended consequences. 
Classification is a tool that can be used to conceptually understand the differences 
in regulations.  Using disjointed incrementalism as its theoretical foundation, this 
research proposes a new typology, a specific form of classification, and utilizes this 
typology to examine a sample of 14 commercial motor vehicle safety regulations 
qualitatively and quantitatively.  This approach offers explanative insights into preferred 
types of regulations as well as predictive insights into how regulations change over time.   
This research also utilizes an Exhaustive Enumeration technique in order to find 
optimal discrete values for the various different HOS regulations.  For example, this 
research found that drivers could accumulate 28.6 percent more average daily driving 
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hours in 2012 than in 2014 due to the recent change in HOS regulations.  Not only are the 
HOS regulations restricting the amount of truck driver hours, but there has also been an 
increase in the amount of HOS regulatory changes.  Eleven of the 23 HOS regulation 
changes have occurred since 2003.  This ever-changing regulatory environment has many 
safety implications to the truck driving industry.  Perishable inventory theory is used to 
understand how companies and truck drivers operate within this regulatory environment.  
This theoretical foundation provides a unique view on possible unintended consequences 
created by some of the recent HOS regulations.  
In July 2013, the Federal Motor Safety Carrier Association (FMSCA) revised its 
Hours of Service (HOS) regulatory policy, which restricts the number of duty and driving 
hours a truck driver can operate.  The revision changed the unlimited restart provision by 
restricting it to 1 restart per 168 hours (1 week) and added that the restart must span two 
consecutive 1 am to 5 am periods.  Lawmakers suspended these two aspects of the restart 
provision in the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations act on December 
16, 2014 until more analysis was completed on the efficacy of these regulations due to 
unintended consequences that allegedly negatively affected motorist’s safety.  Countering 
truck driver fatigue is an important issue and an extremely difficult task because of the 
many confounding aspects that can cause fatigue.  The new regulation set forth in July 
2013, was supposed to lessen fatigue and thus reduce accidents caused by truck drivers.  
The current HOS regulation was in place for approximately 16 months, producing 
enough data for a statistical analysis of its effects on truck driver safety.  This research 
found that by comparing truck driving safety data prior to the change in July of 2013 (the 
unlimited restart provision) to truck driving safety data during the enactment of the 1 
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restart per 168-hour restriction and 1 am to 5 am provision, the percent of accidents 
caused by truck drivers did not decrease.  Furthermore, this research found that the HOS 
changes implemented on July 1, 2013 have not led to a change in the continuing 
downward trend in accidents involved and caused by truck drivers.  These results suggest 
that other factors appear to be linked to motorists’ safety, rather than the updated HOS 
regulation. 
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EXAMINATION OF COMMERCIAL MOTOR VEHICLE HOURS OF SERVICE SAFETY 
REGULATION   
I.  Introduction 
Background 
Although trucks are one of five main modes of logistics (air, maritime, rail, and pipelines 
being the others), they interface with logistics more than any mode.  In fact, 81.9% (ATA 2011) 
in terms of value and 60.1% of volume of U.S. domestic goods are shipped with trucks (Dobbins, 
2007).  Trucks are critical to the shipment and movement of goods mainly in part due to the 
flexibility they provide.  This flexibility is the result of the vast availability of roads, as well as 
the large number of trucks and truck drivers.  There are approximately 3.5 million truck drivers 
and 26.4 million trucks registered (ATA 2016), and about 1 of 15 workers in the country are 
employed in some aspect of the trucking industry (All Trucking 2016).   
The truck industry is vital to the US economy, and if the truck driving industry is 
restricted, it will have great impacts to the economy and to our society.  For example, trucks are 
primarily responsible for moving goods for the food industry, and if trucks were halted for a 
mere three days there would be food shortages across the country (McKinnon 2006).   
While trucks are important for delivering goods, they are also responsible for accidents 
involving other motorists.  Accidents involving trucks occur more often when truck drivers have 
been awake or on duty for long periods (Soccolich et al. 2013; Hanowski et al. 2007; Jovanis et 
al. 2011; Braver et al. 1999).  This safety concern brings about legislation that restricts the truck 
driver’s duty and driving time.  Balancing safety (through restricting truck driver’s hours of 
operation) and maximizing the logistical capacity of trucks and truck drivers is a challenge.     
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There have been both economic and safety regulations in the truck industry.  Hours of 
service (HOS) is one of the safety regulations and is the focus of this research HOS restricts the 
number of hours that a truck driver can operate as well as mandate the number of off-hours prior 
to coming back on duty in order to reduce fatigue and accidents involving trucks.  Pritchard 
(2010) found that there are about 5,000 fatal crashes involving trucks per year resulting in social 
costs greater than 32 billion dollars.  Many of these accidents have been caused by fatigued truck 
drivers, which may have been prevented with proper rest and truck driver awareness (Quan et al. 
2015).  The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMSCA) has instituted measures that 
restrict the driving and duty hours of truck drivers to promote safety and minimize any negative 
economic impact on the commercial motor vehicle industry.  
Research has demonstrated how fatigue leads to increased accident rates by decreasing 
reaction time, disorientation while driving, and overall impaired performance (Williamson et al. 
2011; Min 2009a).  The majority of research has examined the factors that lead to fatigue.  
Research has found an increase in accident rates involving trucks from 50 percent to 200 percent 
in the 10th and 11th hour; and statistically significant accident rates after the 8th hour (Abrams et 
al. 1997; Hanowski et al. 2011; Kaneko & Jovanis 1992; Jovanis et al. 2011).  Research has also 
found contributing factors to fatigue and accident rates such as the number of breaks and break 
duration (Blanco, Hanowski & Olson 2011; Chen & Xie 2014b), sleep habits (Gander et al. 
2006), carrier scheduling practices (M. Crum & Morrow 2002), schedule induced practices 
(Beilock 1995; Soccolich et al. 2013), cargo type (Retzer et al. 2013), loading and unloading 
(Shibuya et al. 2010), obesity and sleep apnea (Anderson et al. 2012), time pressures (Kemp et 
al. 2013), long-haul vs short-haul (Friswell & Williamson 2013), age (Summala & Mikkola 
1994; Duke et al. 2010), and many other factors that can be seen in both Figure 1 and Figure 2.  
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Ironically, one factor that has not been well researched is the factor that attempts to regulate the 
fatigue of truck drivers—HOS regulation.   
Figure 1 Factors Affecting Driver Fatigue (Min, 2009) 
Figure 2 Potential Endogenous and Exogenous Factors on Fatigue (L. Di Militia et al., 2011) 
 
20 
 
Although it is clear that driver fatigue is dangerous and has been linked to higher accident 
rates (Dinges 1995; Mackie & Miller 1978; Williamson & Friswell 2013; Summala & Mikkola 
1994; Zhu & Srinivasan 2011), the effectiveness of HOS regulatory policy on reducing fatigue 
and making roads safer is still unclear (Arnold et al. 1997; Min 2009b).  Research has found that 
many drivers actually begin their driving periods fatigued, indicating that HOS may restrict the 
number of operating hours but does not directly reduce fatigue or ensure alert truck drivers 
(Abrams et al. 1997).   It is also possible that HOS has resulted in less safety for truck drivers 
and motorists.   
HOS may have unintended consequences.  As an example, research found that HOS 
safety regulation increased congestion at peak times putting both motorists and truck drivers at 
more risk (Dingus et al. 2006; Downs 1992; Bucklew 2011; Ferro 2014; FMSCA 2010).  
Similarly HOS provisions may have made motorists less safe due to circadian rhythm swaps 
(Ferro 2014), which has been shown to increase fatigue (Abrams et al. 1997; Arnold et al. 1997; 
Arrow et al. 1996; Sando et al. 2010).   Research has also found that 14 percent of truck drivers 
were found to avoid known check stations (deviating from their route by up to 160 miles) 
thereby driving on less-safe rural roads (Taylor et al., 2000). 
Although scarce, there are examples in western civilizations that contrast the difference 
between regulated and unregulated states providing further evidence for the previous arguments.  
Arnold et al. (1997) discussed unregulated drivers in Australia while Williamson et al. (1992) 
discussed regulated drivers in Australia.  Comparing these two articles provided an interesting 
perspective regarding the potential problems with HOS regulations in Australia (see Table 1).  
These differences suggests that regulations result in less sleep to drivers, more traffic to society, 
higher perceptions of fatigue, longer working hours at varying times of the day, and a higher 
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incident of drug use.  These results were also confirmed by Dingus et al., (2006), who found that 
unregulated drivers (Intra- versus Inter-state) slept more than regulated drivers did.   
 
 
More recently and in the U.S., there have been conflicting claims about the effectiveness 
of recent HOS regulation changes.  Some trucking unions and some members of Congress have 
claimed negative safety implications due to prolonged traffic congestion during daytime hours 
and increased fatigue (Ferro 2014; Short 2013).  Conversely, legislative branch members and 
research has claimed that the HOS revision has decreased accidents, reduced damage, and most 
importantly, saved lives (Ferro 2014; Chen et al. 2015; FMSCA 2010).  
Since there is little research regarding the HOS regulations as a possible factor 
contributing to fatigue and other possible negative safety implications, this research attempts to 
fill this gap.  This research provides three different approaches to understanding HOS regulatory 
impact on safety. 
Arnold et al. Williamson et al.
Unregulated Regulated
Prior Night of Sleep Before Journey 8.25 7.5
Perceive fatigue is an issue for themselves 10% 28% to 35%
Perceive fatigue is an issue for the industry 39% 78%
Coontributions to fatigue Heavy City Traffic
Loading Unloading as a problem with fatigue 33% 47%
Driving at dawn causing fatigue 21% 56%
Long driving hours cause fatigue 38% 49%
Lack of sleep during the trip 40% 32%
Drugs 16% 32%
Table 1 Regulated versus Unregulated Drivers in Australia 
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This research approaches this complex problem by researching three main topics (see 
Figure 3).  First, the regulation is inherently indirect in its approach because it does not target 
fatigue but rather duty hours.  Second, as the regulation changes it alters the hours and capacity 
of truck drivers dramatically, creating many other possible unintended incentives.  Third, since it 
is an indirect policy and incentives may change, it is possible that there will be unknown safety 
consequences from this policy--shown as unintended consequences.     
 
 To elaborate more on the first point, HOS does not directly manage fatigue of truck 
drivers.  Therefore, it is entirely possible that a truck driver follows the rules but still violates the 
intent of the law.  This information is not new, but has not changed this regulation from 
Figure 3 Hours of Service Safety Construct 
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indirectly managing fatigue.  An example is a FMSCA (2000) report quotes an ICC official who 
objected to the proposed HOS regulation in 1937: 
We have no control over the manner in which a driver may spend his time off-duty, 
although some of his spare time activities may tire him as much as any work would do.  
We can only emphasize, by this comment, the responsibility which is the driver's own to 
assure himself of adequate rest and sleep, in the time available for this purpose, to ensure 
safety of his driving, and likewise the employer's responsibility to see that his drivers 
report for work in fit condition (ICC, 1937). 
This quote reveals that HOS is only looking at one factor that relates to fatigue.  This 
implies that this regulation may be very different from other safety regulations in the trucking 
industry.  Thus, the first paper, or chapter 2 of this dissertation, attempts to understand how HOS 
is different from the other regulations by creating, utilizing, and empirically testing a typology 
classification construct. 
 To further expand on the second point; changes in HOS regulations restrict or increase 
capacity for truck drivers.  Restricting or increasing the number of hours a truck driver can 
operate will have corresponding logistical impacts to a lean supply chain.  The number of truck 
drivers, tractors, distribution centers, the amount of inventory needed for a given service level 
are only but a few of the possible changes that may occur to the supply chain.  It is important to 
understand the complex changes that can occur to the supply chain and the truck driving industry 
when HOS regulations are modified.  This is accomplished in paper 2, or chapter 3 of this 
dissertation, which details how perishable inventory theory and its associated tactics can be used 
to understand the complex safety consequences of an ever-changing HOS regulatory body.   
 The third point of this dissertation is to determine if this regulation has increased safety 
or decreased safety for truck drivers and motorists.  This is a difficult problem due to the dates of 
the HOS changes not coinciding with the annual data, and reports indicating if the motorist or 
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truck driver was at fault.  In order to overcome these obstacles, data was used from an Ohio 
database.  From this data, it was possible to discover the number of accidents involving and 
caused by truck drivers regarding property damage, injury, and fatal accidents.  Utilizing 
regression, parametric, and nonparametric techniques, this research was able to examine the 
safety efficacy of HOS in Ohio.  The Ohio data was also extrapolated to provide for an analysis 
on truck driver safety in the U.S.  From this extrapolation, more information was revealed 
regarding the accuracy of FMSCA’s predictions.  
The last chapter of this dissertation provides concluding remarks regarding this research.  
It will also provide the contributions from this research, and possible implications to the 
Department of Defense (DoD).   
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II. A Typology Classification Approach to Exploring Differences in Commercial Motor 
Vehicle Safety Regulations 
Abstract 
Classification is a tool that can be used to conceptually understand the differences in 
regulations.  Using disjointed incrementalism as its theoretical foundation, this research proposes 
a new typology, a specific form of classification, and utilizes this typology to statistically 
examine a sample of 14 commercial motor vehicle safety regulations.  This approach offers 
explanative insights into preferred types of regulations as well as predictive insights into how 
regulations change over time.   
Introduction 
The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMSCA) is charged with regulating 
the safety of the commercial motor vehicle (CMV) or trucking industry.  Safety regulations 
governing the CMV industry have existed since the publication of the first code of federal 
regulation in 1938.  Safety regulations include hours of service (HOS), which stipulates the 
driving and duty time limits for truck drivers.   
HOS has changed frequently since 2000 creating a discussion involving legislators, 
researchers, and the trucking industry regarding what regulations are needed to prevent fatigue-
related accidents.  This research does not attempt to provide an optimal regulation for HOS or 
the factors that may lead to fatigued truck drivers, but rather uses a classification methodology to 
understand differences in the HOS safety regulation from other CMV safety regulations.   
This research provides a descriptive, explanative, and predictive model for regulation 
types.  Each regulation has unique characteristics that can be classified into a two-by-two 
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typology representing four types of regulation.  These types of regulations are: 1) subjective-
direct, 2) subjective-indirect, 3) objective-direct, and 4) objective-indirect.  Classifying 
regulations into this conceptual model enables a descriptive comparative analysis of regulation 
types. 
Since a specific regulation changes over time and those changes are generally viewed as 
improvements, it follows that the change in associated classification type would also be viewed 
as an improvement.  Thus, type changes help explain the type most suitable for a specific 
regulation at a specific time.   
This research also provides predictive power to the eventual type of a regulation given its 
initial type classification.  A predictive model is created by analyzing how a change in a 
regulation can potentially lead to changes in the classification type. 
Each classification type has associated characteristics.  The characteristics of the 
regulation type are 1) character count, 2) section count, and 3) time between changes.  The 
conceptual model can therefore be validated empirically by utilizing parametric and non-
parametric testing techniques to test for differences in characteristics among each type.  
To better understand regulation changes over time, the theory of disjointed 
incrementalism is introduced.  This theory underscores that regulation change occurs 
incrementally due to political feasibility, and occurs disjointedly due to decision-makers’ 
constraints of time, analytical ability, and fragmented goals (Lindblom 1959).     
This research is broken down into five sections.  The literature review details previous 
research in the field of classification.  The methodology and analysis sections discuss the clear 
and repeatable analysis used in this research.  A discussion of the results and possible future 
research directions concludes the article.  
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Literature Review 
Creation of Typology Classification 
The classification of policy provides a theoretical framework needed to better partition 
differences in policy creation and implementation.  This framework enables organization and 
linkage to predictable patterns of policy and implementation in regards to the expected political 
and social behaviors that may arise (Smith 2002; Schneider & Sidney 2009).  Mitchell et al. 
illustrate that classification is a critical prerequisite for understanding the lineage of decisions 
regarding policy (1985).  They also suggest meaningful hypotheses can come from segmenting 
government policies, leading to conclusions on policy performance.  They conclude that the 
classification of policy does not lead to successful policy, but that it is a prerequisite for it.   
 Classification is the foundation for language, speech, math, data analysis and the 
understanding of concepts (Bailey 1994).  For instance, the concept of a vegetable begins and 
ends with the classification of similar or dissimilar ideas (Bailey, 1994).  This classification 
process can also be used for policies implemented by the government, which have the ability to 
affect the human race for generations (Schneider & Sidney 2009).   
Classification of policy is not only important but also challenging (Smith 2002; Lowi 
1972; Bailey 1994; Schneider & Ingram 1997; DeLeo 2015; Lowi 1964; Anderson 1997; 
Drescher et al. 2011) for numerous reasons.  Three of these reasons are: 1) dimension scaling, 2) 
ensuring homogeneity within the policy type and heterogeneity amongst the policy types, and 3) 
clear definitions for classification (Bailey 1994; Kluge 2000).   
Dimension scaling is necessary due to the exponential number of policy types that can be 
created.  For example, a four dichotomous typology has 2
4 
 or 16 types and a four trichotomous 
typology would have 3
4
 or 81 types.  More types may create clearer differences and 
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heterogeneity amongst the types, however the model’s complexity may lose usefulness due to its 
complexity (Bailey 1994).  
 Creating a simple typology may provide a useful conceptual and descriptive model as 
long as its types can be clearly differentiated.  Homogeneity within the type and heterogeneity 
among the types creates the most useful typology but requires specific and repeatable 
classification techniques (Kluge 2000; Barton 1955).   
Smith (2002) discussed that a typological approach can be powerful but prone to 
classification error and therefore not repeatable.  He discusses how loose definitions regarding 
subjective classifications are one of the most common errors within classification research that 
leads to questionable and non-repeatable results. 
Policy and Regulatory Design 
Research regarding classification of policy types and creation of typologies within the 
field of CMV policy does not exist, based on the literature search.  However, there is a plethora 
of research within the social sciences that can be drawn from to bridge this research gap in the 
CMV policy field.   
 In policy design, Schneider and Sidney (2009) suggest the first step is the problem 
definition and goals to be pursued.  The goal of the regulation may be straightforward, but the 
implementation of the policy may not be because of the inability to measure the goal—leading to 
an indirect policy.  For example, the HOS regulation intends to eliminate driving while fatigued 
(Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration 2016); however, the regulation only restricts the 
duty and driving time, which have been shown to be factors in fatigued driving (Brown 1986; 
Torregroza-Vargas et al. 2014; Williamson et al. 1992; Williamson et al. 2011); but there are 
also many other factors that contribute to truck driver fatigue.  A few of these fatigue factors that 
 
29 
 
are not regulated by HOS are: multi-day driving patterns (Kaneko & Jovanis 1992); starting 
fatigue level (M. R. Crum & Morrow 2002); driving time of day (Blower & Campbell 1998); 
miles driven (Lyman & Braver 2003; Joshua & Garber 1990; Jovanis & Chang 1986); truck 
driver health (Anderson et al. 2012; Stoohs et al. 1994), traffic congestion (Taylor & Dorn 2006); 
truck driver obesity (Anderson et al. 2012; Stoohs et al. 1994); distracted driving (Olson et al. 
2009; Hanowski et al. 2005); stress, health and narcotics (Taylor & Dorn 2006; Hartley & 
Hassani 1994; Crouch et al. 1993); scheduling (M. R. Crum & Morrow 2002; Min 2009b); and 
attitudes (Douglas & Swartz 2009).  Thus, HOS may have different results than other safety 
regulations because it is not directly regulating or measuring fatigue.   
Schane (2002) examines the legal words found in laws and finds that some are not always 
clear; leading to the law being understood in more than one way.  Veenhoven (2002) discusses 
these vague or subjective words and their importance in social policy.  Objective measures focus 
on the facts while subjective measures on the soft facts.  He states that subjective indicators 
enable a subjective measurement and may require change for clarity.  However, subjective 
measures can sometimes provide the regulations’ intent or goal, while objective measures tend to 
be more myopic by looking at sum-scores.  The combination of both subjective and objective 
regulations may lead to a more comprehensive regulation that can be objectively enforced by 
numbers and clear guidelines, while also providing the goal or intent of the regulation.   
Disjointed Incrementalism 
The theory of disjointed incrementalism gives emphasis to the capacity of legislatures, 
their method, and the eventual acceptance of policy (Lindblom 1959).  The first point, that this 
theory suggests, is that the capacity of legislators is limited mainly due to time constraints and 
limited expertise.  These limitations can lead to disjointed policy.  The next main point from this 
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theory is the method by which policy is created, which emphasizes the disjointed and 
incremental aspect.  Generally, when there are agreed upon values, the ends justify the means.  
When there are conflicting values (which occurs due to special interests groups, concerned 
citizens, and legislatures), the means and ends are simultaneous chosen for expediency and 
compromise.  This method may lead to disjointed policy through exemptions and other aspects 
of the regulation and incremental changes in policy, which meet the aspirations of society and 
legislators constituents while minimizing political risk. 
Method 
The first part of the methodology details the conceptual model (typology) that was 
created.  Dimension scaling was accomplished to keep the typology simple (Bailey 1994).  Two 
monothetic dimensions were used to create a fourfold typology.  The four types are subjective-
direct, subjective-indirect, objective-direct, and objective-indirect.  Subjective and objective 
were chosen due to the prevalence of ambiguity and misunderstandings that occur in laws and 
regulations (Schane 2002).  The dimension of direct and indirect were used due to the varying 
level of agreement that sometimes exist between the means (regulation) and ends (goals) of the 
regulation (Montgomery 1990; Nicoletti & Scarpetta 2003; Lindblom 1959).   
 Bailey (1994) stated that the secret to classification is the ability to ascertain and 
differentiate the fundamental characteristics of the phenomenon studied.  In our research, the 
clear and comprehensive definitions were critical to the success of this research and were 
developed after consulting with a lawyer, a compliance manager, and other researchers.  The 
definitions utilized for this research are as follows: 
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• Objective:  The typical prudent person would understand this rule and know with 
reasonable certainty when a situation was in or out of compliance with the stated rule.  
- Example: Drive no faster than 45 mph 
• Subjective:  Discretion and interpretation is required to act in accordance with this rule.  
The typical prudent person would have trouble clearly classifying whether a specific 
situation was in or out of compliance.  Frequently, reasonable arguments could be made 
in support of either compliance or noncompliance for a given scenario. 
- Example: Drive safely 
• Direct:  What is governed, measured, or stipulated by the rule is highly correlated with 
the desired or undesired behavior.  Disobeying the rule naturally and consistently leads to 
predictably unfavorable outcomes regarding the regulation’s desired goal.   
- Example: No drinking of alcohol 10 hours before or while operating a vehicle 
(Direct because the regulation is restricting the direct act of being under the 
influence of alcohol) 
• Indirect:  What is governed, measured, or stipulated by the rule may or may not be 
unequivocally correlated with the desired or undesired behavior.  A prudent person can 
cite plausible and common scenarios in which following the rule will not lead to the 
desired outcome.   
- Example: No going to a bar before or while on duty (Indirect, because the 
regulation is restricting a behavior that may or may not lead to being under the 
influence of alcohol)   
 Certain assumptions are also needed in order to classify these regulations.  First, this 
research assumes that some regulations are not fully comprehensive or exhaustive and a 
classification of a regulation does not depend on whether the regulation captures every possible 
scenario.  Second, this research assumes that the numbers or limits stipulated by the regulations 
are correct.  This research does not argue whether .04-blood alcohol content (BAC) is the right 
value, but rather whether a value is provided and understood.  Third, this research assumes that 
some regulations may require a capability of enforcement that is not likely to occur due to 
limitations of enforcing agents.   
Hein Online was the primary instrument used to collect the data on the regulations.  
Regulations were digitally captured for the period of 1938 to 2016, which corresponds to the 
beginning of regulations on the commercial motor vehicle (CMV) industry.  The Code of Federal 
Regulations (CFRs) and list of sections affected were used to capture the dates and associated 
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regulation changes.  Due to title number changes and limitations on CFRs before 1961, the 
Federal Register (FR) was also searched for any final ruling on the specific regulation.  The FR 
also provided relevant information and discussion during the hearing or changing of the 
regulation that aided in the rationale for the regulatory change. 
Fourteen different CMV safety regulations were chosen from dissimilar CFR parts under 
title 49 in order to gather a wide variety of regulations to analyze.  The 14 regulations dealt with 
the following issues 1) Brake Performance, 2) Sleeper Berth, 3) Inspection, Repair, and 
Maintenance, 4) Tires, 5) Hazardous Conditions, 6) Alcohol Prohibition, 7) Ill or Fatigued 
Drivers, 8) Necessary Driving Knowledge and Compliance of the Regulations, 9) Needed Skill 
and Experience, 10) Drugs and Other Substances, 11) Hearing Requirements, 12) Eyesight 
Requirements, 13) HOS, and 14) Safe Loading Procedures.  Any associated change to these 
regulations or subparts of these regulations were documented.  Documenting this data enabled an 
analysis of the level of change (substantial or non-substantial), the character and section count 
involved the change, the date of the change, and the reason for the change (if available).  
Non-substantial changes were based on minor modifications to references, titles, or parts 
of the regulation.  An examples of these non-substantive changes include changing him to 
him/her or the driver, and “motor vehicle” to “commercial motor vehicle driver” (Federal Motor 
Carrier Safety Administration 1995).  Substantial changes occurred when the regulation added or 
deleted sections, or changed wording.   
The initial regulation and any associated substantial changes were provided to four 
logistics doctoral students for classification.  Based on the results of this pretest, minor revisions 
were made to the definitions, instructions, and formatting prior to giving it to the classification 
team.   
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The specific regulations and the chronological changes were provided to four academics 
on the classification team.  The team classified 275 changes that occurred in the 14 regulations 
between 1938 and 2016.  The change in part of the regulation as well as the entire regulation was 
classified based on the definitions provided.  To assess inter-rater reliability, pairwise percent 
agreements and Cohen’s Kappa statistics were calculated (Fleiss 1973; Cohen-Mansfield & 
Werner 1997).  Kappa values range from 0 to 1 with the closer to 1 indicating a closer agreement 
of classification types from the team (Fleiss 1973).   
After the team classified the regulation and the subparts of the regulation into the specific 
types, a statistical analysis was completed.  Measurements including the mean time a regulation 
stayed a certain type; the probability of a regulation changing from one type to a different type; 
and if information was available, the circumstances that led to the change in the regulation was 
analyzed.   
An empirical analysis was also conducted after the regulations were classified into types 
in order to strengthen this typology construct.  The characteristics of the typology that were used 
were character count, growth in both characters and sections over time, number of substantial 
changes, and probability of change to a different type.  To examine differences between types, 
averages, standard errors and deviations, and Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) testing was 
conducted followed by the post-hoc Fisher’s Least Significant Difference (LSD) pairwise 
comparison.  ANOVA parametric assumptions were met for character and section count, which 
assessed normality using the Shapiro-Wilks test (Razali & Wah 2011); constant variance was 
assessed using the Bartlett test (Levene 1960); and independence by time was assessed via the 
Durbin-Watson test (Kanlayasiri & Boonmung 2007).  However, for number of substantial 
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changes, parametric assumptions were not met.  Consequently, non-parametric tests were 
conducted using the Wilcoxon Signed Rank test (Hollander et al. 2013). 
Analysis 
The Cohen’s Kappa value regarding the inter-rater reliability of the classification of 
regulation into specific types was 0.8 with an average pairwise agreement of 86.5 percent.  This 
kappa value falls at the top of the substantial agreement range and just shy of almost perfect 
agreement (Landis & Koch 1977).   
Of the regulations that existed in 1938, 11 were classified initially as subjective-direct, 1 
as objective-direct, 2 as not existent yet (--), and 1 as objective-indirect (see Table 2).  The 
objective percent and direct percent are shown for each regulation. A general trend was that each 
regulation became more objective over time.  The number of sections and characters is listed 
underneath the percentages and provides information about the size of the regulation changes.  
The general trend with regulation size was an increase in character count and sections, which 
was correlated with the shift to more objective regulation types.  Of the regulations that began as 
subjective-direct, nine became objective-direct and four ended as subjective-direct.  The two 
regulations that began as objective-direct remained that type.  Hours of service regulation was 
the only regulation classified as objective-indirect and it remained this type. 
Overall movement of regulation types are shown in Figure 4.  Subjective-direct 
regulations had a 71.5% chance of staying subjective-direct upon a substantial change to the 
regulation and a 28.5% chance of changing type to objective-direct.  Subjective-direct regulatory 
types changed at a rate of 23.5 years and a standard deviation of 13.8 years.  This type changed to 
an objective-direct type at a rate of 28.7 years with a standard deviation of 5.3 years.  Objective-
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direct regulation types changed at a rate of 19.5 years and a standard deviation of 12.2 years.  
Indirect-objective regulation types changed at a rate of 7.09 years and a standard deviation of 7 
years.   
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Table 2: Regulation by Year Objective / Direct Percent and Characteristic (Section count, Character count) 
Date 1938 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2016
CFR 1 3 15 25 35 45 55 65 75 81
Brake 
Performance 
63%/100% 
(3,853)
75%/100%  
(3,1199)
75%/100% 
(3,1223)
63%/100% 
(3,971)
100%/100% 
(6,954)
100%/100% 
(10,1617)
100%/100% 
(10,1617)
100%/100% 
(10,1617)
100%/100% 
(11,2240)
100%/100% 
(11,2240)
Sleeper Berth -- -- --
70%/78% 
(12,3852)
70%/78% 
(12,3983)
62%/78% 
(20,3716)
62%/78% 
(21,3571)
62%/78% 
(21,3571)
62%/78% 
(21,3571)
62%/78% 
(21,3570)
Equipment 
Inspection
--
%/100% 
(2,206)
%/100% 
(2,206)
71%/79% 
(6,1414)
71%/79% 
(7,1447)
77%/91% 
(12,1909)
77%/86% 
(11,1737)
77%/82% 
(10,1776)
75%/84% 
(10,2003)
75%/84% 
(10,2003)
Tires
25%/75% 
(2,199)
25%/75% 
(2,207)
25%/75% 
(2,207)
33%/100% 
(4,919)
100%/100% 
(6,915)
92%/98% 
(14,2494)
93%/93% 
(16,3016)
94%/94% 
(17,1821)
93%/94% 
(18,3191)
93%/94% 
(18,3191)
Cargo 
Inspection
0%/100% 
(2,199)
0%/100% 
(2,207)
0%/100% 
(2,207)
0%/100% 
(4,919)
17%/100% 
(6,915)
48%/98% 
(14,2494)
48%/98% 
(16,3016)
48%/98% 
(17,1821)
48%/98% 
(18,3191)
48%/98% 
(18,3191)
Hazardous 
Conditions
0%/100% 
(2,293)
0%/100% 
(2,326)
0%/100% 
(2,326)
0%/100% 
(2,326)
0%/100% 
(2,668)
0%/100% 
(2,668)
0%/100% 
(2,668)
0%/100% 
(2,725)
0%/100% 
(2,725)
0%/100% 
(2,728)
Impaired 
Driving
0%/100% 
(2,461)
0%/100% 
(2,474)
0%/100% 
(2,465)
0%/100% 
(2,465)
0%/100% 
(2,459)
0%/100% 
(2,643)
0%/100% 
(2,643)
0%/100% 
(2,708)
0%/100% 
(2,708)
0%/100% 
(2,709)
Knowledge
0%/75% 
(2,358)
0%/75% 
(2,334)
0%/75% 
(2,335)
0%/75% 
(2,335)
0%/100% 
(2,187)
89%/100% 
(12,3616)
89%/100% 
(12,3616)
0%/100% 
(2,187)
0%/100% 
(2,187)
0%/100% 
(2,187)
Experience
13%/100% 
(3,303)
13%/100% 
(3,329)
13%/100% 
(2,324)
13%/100% 
(2,324)
13%/100% 
(4,368)
76%/93% 
(20,3386)
76%/93% 
(20,3386)
76%/93% 
(20,3522)
76%/93% 
(20,3522)
76%/93% 
(20,3516)
Narcotics
25%/75% 
(2,79)
25%/75% 
(2,166)
25%/75% 
(2,159)
25%/75% 
(2,159)
25%/75% 
(2,159)
68%/100% 
(8,990)
75%/100% 
(9,1024)
75%/100% 
(9,1045)
75%/100% 
(9,1045)
75%/100% 
(9,1045)
Alcohol
25%/100% 
(2,186)
25%/100% 
(2,247)
25%/100% 
(2,247)
25%/100% 
(2,247)
25%/100% 
(2,348)
65%/95% 
(8,1009)
84%/93% 
(15,2580)
90%/94% 
(17,2717)
90%/94% 
(17,2735)
90%/94% 
(17,2735)
Hearing
0%/100% 
(2,35)
0%/100% 
(2,35)
0%/100% 
(2,35)
0%/100% 
(2,35)
75%/100% 
(2,122)
75%/100% 
(2,434)
75%/100% 
(2,434)
75%/100% 
(2,434)
75%/100% 
(2,434)
75%/100% 
(2,434)
Eyesight
0%/100% 
(1,151)
100%/100% 
(1,292)
100%/100% 
(1,292)
100%/100% 
(1,292)
100%/100% 
(1,375)
100%/100% 
(1,470)
100%/100% 
(1,470)
100%/100% 
(1,470)
100%/100% 
(1,470)
100%/100% 
(1,470)
HOS
100%/0% 
(4,1185)
100%/0% 
(4,1363)
100%/0% 
(3,2596)
100%/0% 
(3,2596)
100%/0% 
(6,3264)
100%/0% 
(8,3424)
100%/0% 
(16,2622)
100%/0% 
(8,1220)
100%/0% 
(7,1117)
100%/0% 
(13,2736)
*Blue indicates Subjective-Direct, Yellow indicates Objective-Indirect, White indicates Objective-Direct, -- Not existent yet  
Figure 4: Type Movement 
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The Federal Register (FR) sometimes provided the rationale for the change in regulation.  
Oral hearings and written testimonies were also examined in the FRs to determine the impetus 
for the change in regulation type.  Upon changing regulatory type, the majority of reasons for the 
change were due to three main factors: 1) legal clarity, 2) availability of new technology, 3) 
comprehensive regulatory reform (change in standards and or new aspects to regulate).  These 
reasons for type change are depicted in Figure 4.  Although entire regulations did not change 
from type indirect to direct, there were sections of the regulation that did change due to legal 
clarity and technology.  For example, in 1988 a bill was passed to stipulate that blood alcohol 
content of drivers not exceed .004, which moved aspects of the overall regulation from indirect 
to directly measurement due to the ability to utilize technology (FHWA Docket No. MC-128 
1988).  Therefore, legal clarity and technology are possibly the catalysts for change in an indirect 
to a direct type. 
Empirically testing to see if the types are different in the conceptual model is 
accomplished by statistically analyzing the type characteristics (time until regulation change, 
characters, and sections).  The types (objective-direct OD, subjective-direct SD, and objective-
indirect) were significantly different from one another (see Table 3) for characters and sections 
(p-value < .0001).  Subjective-direct regulations were statistically different from both the 
objective-direct (p-value .017) and objective-indirect (p-value .003) regulation types.  However, 
there was no statistically significant difference between objective-direct and objective-indirect 
(p-value of .16) regulation types.  
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Discussion and Conclusion 
The conceptual typology model created provides the ability to further differentiate 
regulations.  Although this study does not discuss the efficacy of these different types of 
regulations, it can be assumed that based on the changes in regulation type there are more 
preferred or effective types of regulation.  If a change occurred, subjective-direct regulation types 
moved to objective-direct 28.5 percent of the time, and only moved back 3 percent of the time 
(due to a unique situation), leading to 7 of the 11 initially subjective-direct type ending as an 
objective-direct type.  This implies that objective regulations seem to be preferred to subjective 
regulations.  
One main observation of this research is that the Hours of Service (HOS) is the only 
regulation from the sample that began and ended as an indirect type.  No regulations moved from 
direct to indirect or indirect to direct, but since the majority of regulations are classified as direct 
it would seem that this type of regulations is preferred.  Since HOS is regulating a factor related 
to fatigue but not fatigue itself, it makes more sense why this regulation is continually changed.  
This regulation substantially changed on average every 7.09 years.  This was significantly more 
frequent than subjective-direct (p value .003) type.  In the event that a technology came out that 
could measure driver fatigue, HOS regulation may become direct.  Until that time, it is very 
Table 3 Typology Characteristic Comparison (Character count, Section Counts, Years until Substantial 
Change 
Comparison
µ σ n µ σ n µ σ n (P-Value)
Character Count  1866.7   1235.6  553   637.5    623.7  439  2432.0    826.0  79
OI>OD>SD 
(<.0001)
Section Count     9.9      6.6  553     3.5      3.5  439     7.25     3.7  79
OD>OI>SD 
(<.0001)
Years Until 
Substantial Change
   14.4     15.3  43    23.5     13.7  25     7.8      7.0  11 SD>OD (.017), 
SD>OI (.003)
Objective Direct (OD) Subjective Direct (SD) Objective Indirect (OI)
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likely that more HOS regulatory reform will continue in an attempt to indirectly regulate fatigue.  
This sentiment was captured in the following ICC commissioner quote of 1937:  
We have no control over the manner in which a driver may spend his time off-
duty, although some of his spare time activities may tire him as much as any work 
would do.  We can only emphasize, by this comment, the responsibility which is 
the driver's own to assure himself of adequate rest and sleep, in the time available 
for this purpose, to ensure safety of his driving, and likewise the employer's 
responsibility to see that his drivers report for work in fit condition (ICC, 1937). 
Another discussion point that this research finds is the duration a type of regulation 
remains the same.  Subjective-direct regulations types (19.67 years) changed significantly less 
frequently than objective-direct types (13.67 years) and objective-indirect types (7.09 years) (see 
Table 3).  This research found that for most regulations, an objective approach appears to be 
preferred over time.  However, some subjective regulations did not change types.  A possible 
explanation for this is a lack of availability of new technology.  For example, the hazardous 
conditions regulation (392.14) remained completely subjective-direct from 1938 to 2016.  This 
regulation did not change much from its original form in 1938: 
Extreme caution in the operation of motor vehicles shall be exercised under hazardous conditions, such 
as snow, ice, sleet, fog, mist, rain, dust, smoke, or any other condition, which adversely affects visibility 
or traction, and speed shall be reduced accordingly. 
 
It is possible to make this regulation objective but the technology is not readily available.  For 
instance, airports use technology to provide very objective and detailed reports regarding the 
airport environment such as the runway surface condition (RSC) and the runway visual range 
(RVR).  Attempting to do this on all roads would be prohibitively expensive and therefore, this 
regulation remains subjective.  However, aspects of this regulation may begin to become more 
objective in the near future due to technologies like Light Detection and Ranging (LIDR), which 
may provide objective information about current visibility restrictions due to smoke, fog, rain or 
other particulates.   
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Another major finding of this research is the statistical difference among the size 
(characters, and sections) of the different types of regulation.  Of the three types classified in this 
research, all were significantly different (p-value <.0001).  Subjective regulations were the 
smallest, which could be explained by lack of regulation needed to describe intent rather than 
enforceable procedures.  The objective-indirect type was substantially larger than either 
objective-direct or subjective-direct types.  Since there are many indirect factors that contribute 
to the problem, indirect regulations may naturally grow in size to attempt to control these many 
factors.   
The theory of disjointed incrementalism has been used to further explore the policy 
governing the trucking industry.  This research analyzed regulations from the past 80 years to 
understand how and why regulations move or change.  From this retrospective, longitudinal 
research, it seems that regulations change incrementally and disjointedly due to the limited 
knowledge, political feasibility and outside influences.  For example, exemptions, especially 
when studied longitudinally, provide evidence to the disjointed nature of lawmaking.  To 
illustrate this point, some of the HOS regulation exemptions occurred for agriculture drivers 
(1940), oilfield drivers (1963), or drivers in Alaska (1964).  Regulations continually grow in size.  
Based on the proposed rules, regulations found in the federal register and Table 3, it appears that 
regulations grow incrementally based on political feasibility and expediency.   
Given the new regulation typology proposed by this research, there is a plethora of future 
research needed to either further substantiate it or find its weaknesses in different fields.  
Additional research can be conducted on different characteristics of the types discussed in this 
research.  Some of these include the efficacy of the regulation or rule to see which regulations 
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tend to provide better results regarding their intended objective.  Other characteristics such as 
cost could be explored in order to provide a better cost-benefit of different regulation types. 
The implications of this research are far-reaching due to the practical typology created.  
Managers, legislators, and government agencies can benefit from understanding the different 
classifications while creating or modifying rules and regulations.  Creating only subjective rules 
may most likely lead to less control and ambiguous policies, while creating objective regulations 
may lead to greater control and clearer policies.  Indirect policies may lead to more changes over 
time and more complex regulations.  In creating rules and regulation, it would appear that some 
initial subjectivity is needed to provide the intent and goal, while the majority of the regulation 
should seek to be objective to provide more legal clarity and to utilize emerging technologies. 
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III. Evaluating Hours-of-Service Impact on Truck Driving Capacity and Safety 
Implications: An Application of Perishable Inventory Theory  
Abstract 
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMSCA) stipulates the Hours of Service 
(HOS) regulations in order to minimize or eliminate fatigued truck driving, a major cause of 
truck-related accidents.  This research utilizes an Exhaustive Enumeration technique in order to 
find optimal discrete values for the various different HOS regulations.  For example, this 
research found that drivers could accumulate 28.6 percent more average daily driving hours in 
2012 than in 2014 due to the change in HOS regulations that occurred in 2013.  Eleven HOS 
regulation changes have occurred since 2003.  This ever-changing regulatory environment has 
many safety implications to the truck driving industry.  Perishable inventory theory is introduced 
and used to provide the lens to understand how companies and truck drivers operate within this 
environment, providing a unique view on possible unintended consequences created by some of 
the recent HOS regulations.  
Introduction 
Historically, fatal accidents involving truck drivers have often resulted in heightened 
press, public outcry, and motor carrier regulation reform (Jensen & Dahl 2009).  For example, in 
2005 when a fatigued truck driver struck a high school bus, killing five band members and 
injuring many others, the result was increased scrutiny of truck driver time limits, also known as 
Hours of Service (HOS) (Plungis & Voreacos 2014).   
More recently, in 2014, comedian Tracy Morgan was seriously injured and his friend, 
James McNair, was killed in an accident caused by a fatigued truck driver.  An investigation 
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revealed the truck driver was on duty for nearly 14 hours, the maximum allowed by HOS 
regulations.  Additionally, the driver had been awake for more than 24 hours, allegedly rendering 
him unable to react appropriately (Margolin et al. 2014).  This accident was widely publicized in 
the press, and the public demanded action (Margolin et al. 2014).  Just prior to this accident, the 
True Safety Act was anticipated to easily pass in the House of Representatives, which would 
have redacted certain controversial HOS provisions.  However, some legislators feared that 
redacting these provisions would have appeared as a relaxing of the regulations, and therefore, it 
was not pursued (Pyke 2014).  Over time, as public interest subsided, the True Safety Act 
eventually passed.  Although it is clear that the truck driver was fatigued, it is possible that 
certain HOS regulations are creating some accidents due to the additional stress on truck drivers 
that leads to fatigue (Min 2009b), and possibly more fatigue from changing driving times.  
The passing of this act mainly concentrated on suspending two of the most controversial 
rules of the restart provision (The restart provision allows truck drivers to reset their duty time 
log back to 0, as long as certain stipulations are met).  Two of the three restart provisions that 
were suspended detailed the number of restarts a truck driver could take (limit of 1 restart per 
168 hours), and the coinciding time of the restart (must occur over two full consecutive 1 am to 5 
am periods).  These recent provisions were suspended until future research was conducted.   
Due to the many recent HOS changes, questions arise concerning the stability and 
effectiveness of the HOS regulations, creating a need for further research and debate on the 
issues.  Although fatigue has been linked to higher accident rates (Dinges 1995; Mackie & Miller 
1978; Williamson & Friswell 2013; Summala & Mikkola 1994; Zhu & Srinivasan 2011), the 
effectiveness of HOS regulatory policy on reducing fatigue and making roads safer is still 
unclear (Arnold et al. 1997; Min 2009b).  Prodigious research has been accomplished regarding 
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accidents involving trucks due to fatigue (Morrow & Crum 2004; Abrams et al. 1997; Dingus et 
al. 2006); distracted driving (Olson et al. 2009; Hanowski et al. 2005); stress, health and 
narcotics (Taylor & Dorn 2006; Hartley & Hassani 1994; Crouch et al. 1993); scheduling (M. R. 
Crum & Morrow 2002; Min 2009b); and attitudes (Douglas & Swartz 2009).  This dissertation 
research incorporates this previous research and builds upon it by using perishable inventory 
theory as the theoretical foundation to provide a more comprehensive examination of the 
efficacy of HOS governing the perishable product of truck drivers’ time.   
Truck drivers’ time has two perishable aspects – deterioration and obsolescence.  Truck 
drivers’ abilities deteriorate with each passing hour, and they become less safe to navigate the 
roadways due to fatigue (Min 2009b).  Truck drivers also become temporarily obsolete due to 
Hours of Service (HOS) regulations, even though they may be able to drive safely.  This occurs 
because the regulations stipulate that the driver must stop driving at the end of the given 
restrictive period.  In both scenarios (deterioration and obsolescence), a truck driver’s time is 
perishable; as such, perishable inventory theory and some of its concepts (Nahmias 1974; 
Nahmias 1975; Nahmias & Pierskalla 1976; Nahmias 1982) are important to this research and 
can be used to better understand the impact of HOS on the trucking industry.  Some of the 
essential tactics used in perishable inventory theory to maximize the utilization of perishable 
goods and services in this research are: 1) long-term plan, 2) flexibility, 3) first-in-first-out 
(FIFO) and last-in-last-out (LIFO), 4) capacity, 5) substitution and elimination, and 6) 
heterogeneity (Nahmias 1974; Nahmias 1982; Kishore et al. 2011; Fitzsimmons 1985; Siferd et 
al. 1992).   
As previously stated, HOS regulations have been recently changing.  These changes alter 
one or all of the previously mentioned perishable inventory tactics; and consequently, have 
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different safety implications for truck drivers.  For example, if truck drivers operated under the 1 
restart per 168 hours restriction and the 1 am to 5 am provision, more capacity (a key perishable 
inventory tactic) may be achieved by driving during the day than at night even with significant 
congestion.  Since research has associated higher accident rates with more congestion (Campbell 
1995; Kononov et al. 2008), it is logical that the 1 restart per 168 hours restriction and the 1 am 
to 5 am provision, could have negative safety implications for truck drivers.   
As another example utilizing a different tactic of perishable inventory theory—flexibility, 
suppose a truck driver can only operate 14 hours of duty per day, which is a rolling clock and 
starts upon the first duty (FMSCA 2015).  If a truck driver wants to take a nap due to a moderate 
or severe impairment of the natural circadian rhythm (Grugle 2014), the 14-hour running 
restriction may disincentivize the truck driver to rest.  This rigid regulation reduces the flexibility 
(Jensen & Dahl 2009) and could lead to increased fatigue and greater negative safety 
implications for some truck drivers. 
In order to understand the implications of HOS on truck driver safety, this research 
investigates two aspects of the regulatory environment that can alter the tactics of perishable 
inventory theory—the frequency, and the magnitude of regulatory changes.  This research is 
organized in four main sections: literature review, methodology, analysis, and conclusion.  First, 
the literature review provides the background regarding HOS history and perishable inventory 
theory, creating the link of perishable inventory theory concepts to labor and its applications 
within perishable goods and services.  Next, the paper will discuss the methodologies used 
followed by an analysis and discussion section providing additional insight on how the updated 
HOS regulations have changed truck drivers’ ability to provide their perishable service.  Lastly, 
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this research will suggest future research in this field and conclude with managerial and 
regulatory implications. 
Literature Review 
The literature review is divided into two sections.  The first introduces perishable 
inventory management and identifies some of the tactics mentioned in research related to 
perishability to frame the discussion on possible HOS safety implications on the trucking driving 
industry.  The second section provides a background on HOS regulations.   
Perishable Inventory 
This research uses an approach advocated by Raafat (1991) which combines the 
perishable inventory theory literature (Nahmias 1982) and the deteriorating goods literature 
(Bakker et al. 2012).  Both of these bodies of literature discuss tactics that can be used to deal 
primarily with tangible goods, whereas the Perishable Asset Revenue Model (PARM) and Yield 
Management literatures primarily discuss strategies for optimizing the use of services and labor 
(Weatherford & Bodily 1992; Kimes 1989).  Even though these different bodies of literature tend 
to focus on either goods or services (which can be problematic since there are very few pure 
goods or pure services), the tactics used to reach end goals are often very similar.  For instance, 
both goods and labor are critical aspects to the manufacturing process (Sengupta et al. 2006).  
Like inventory, a shortage of labor will produce less of a service or finished good while too 
much labor increases overhead and waste (Rogerson 1992; Aghazadeh 2003).   
Goyal and Giri (2001) categorize inventory into two main categories: deterioration and 
obsolescence.  Deterioration denotes a natural degradation and ongoing loss of value or quality 
over time.  Deterioration occurs in many items such as blood, drugs, and food.  Using the correct 
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tactics ensures that these items have greater utility (Nahmias 1975).  Other items, such as clothes 
and computers experience a different problem — obsolescence (Siriruk 2012).  Obsolescence is 
different from deterioration, because it refers to an instantaneous loss of value without a 
corresponding loss of quality.  Obsolescence is caused by many reasons, such as changes in 
technology or in customer preferences and because of regulations.   
Perishable inventory theory submits that goods deteriorate linearly or exponentially over 
time, and goods become perishable mainly due to deterioration (Nahmias 1975).  Similar to 
perishable goods, labor also experiences both types of perishability: deterioration and 
obsolescence.  For example, a truck driver experiences perishable deterioration through loss of 
skills, mainly due to fatigue (Grugle 2014) because subsequent driving hours are associated with 
lower performance or utility and lead to an increased risk of an accident (Short & Murray 2014).  
On the other hand, regulatory policy can lead to obsolescence due to drivers reaching the 
maximum amount of driving or duty hours in a given period.  Unlike the permanent 
obsolescence of milk, which the U.S. Federal Drug Administration (FDA) prohibits being sold 
after the expiration date (although it may still be safe to drink), a truck driver’s obsolescence is 
temporary and can be reset through rest.  The U.S. Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration 
(FMSCA) prohibits driving after the regulated hours (even though the truck driver may still be 
safe to drive).  Hence, truck drivers are affected similarly to perishable inventory: they 
experience deterioration through natural fatigue, and they are subject to obsolescence due to 
regulation. 
Properly following certain tactics protects against the aspects of deterioration and 
obsolescence of perishable products.  These tactics (as shown in Figure 5) are capacity, 
substitution and/or elimination, strategic planning, flexibility, FIFO or LIFO, and heterogeneity.  
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These tactics were identified from the various bodies of perishability-related literature and are 
discussed in more detail in the following sections.   
 
 
Although perishable goods and labor have similarities concerning deterioration and 
obsolescence, they have one primary difference—labor hours cannot be accumulated or stocked.  
They are produced and consumed simultaneously, otherwise known as simultaneity 
(Fitzsimmons et al. 2013).  Consequently, unused labor becomes instantly obsolete as time 
Figure 5 Commonly Used Tactics for Dealing with the Aspects of Perishable Inventory Theory, 
Yield Management, and Perishable Asset Revenue Model (PARM) 
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passes.  As a result of this type of obsolescence, two other bodies of literature regarding 
perishability are utilized to bridge this gap: Yield Management (Kimes 1989) and the Perishable 
Asset Revenue Model (PARM) (Weatherford & Bodily 1992).  Unbooked airline seats, empty 
hotel rooms, unrented cars, unfilled trucks, unutilized doctors’ and nurses’ time are all examples 
of perishable services classified under both yield management and PARM (Weatherford & 
Bodily 1992; Kimes 1989).  These fields help provide more guidance concerning the tactics used 
when obsolescence rapidly occurs.  For example, an empty airline seat becomes obsolete the 
moment the plane takes off, as does the empty space in a trailer when a truck leaves a docking 
station.  Similarly, unused labor is instantly lost if it is not productive.  One of the main tactics 
explored, to deal with rapid obsolescence, is service capacity utilization.   
Service capacity utilization is a metric that helps ensure that the service is rendered and 
does not become unfulfilled or obsolete (Weatherford & Bodily 1992).  Both physical capacity 
and labor capacity are inputs into service capacity utilization (Siferd et al. 1992). Within the 
trucking industry, physical capacity is the infrastructure needed to conduct operations (truck, 
trailers, loading docks, etc.) and labor capacity is the operator of the equipment (truck driver).  
Optimizing profits occurs from correctly pairing the right amount of physical capacity and labor 
capacity (Siferd et al. 1992).  HOS regulations dictate the duration of driving or duty time truck 
drivers can operate, and when these regulations change so does labor capacity and the optimal 
service capacity utilization.  Thus, service capacity utilization may be an important tactic for 
understanding the impact of HOS on truck drivers’ perishable time. 
Fitzsimmons (1985) discusses the concepts of service capacity utilization that are 
appropriate for service professions such physicians; noting the permanent loss to the service 
provider when physicians are idle.  He also discussed how to increase the utilization of 
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physicians’ time through elimination or substitution.  Elimination involves completely removing 
non-value-added aspects from physicians’ workloads, whereas substitution involves shifting 
activities to lower-level staff within the medical organization.  Shifting activities (substitution) 
such as filling out paperwork or prescreening to lower-level staff directly increases the utilization 
of the physicians’ skill set (Jo Bitner et al. 1997; Fitzsimmons 1985).  Furthermore, the more 
valuable or time-restricted the perishable service is, the more elimination of non-value-added 
activities and substitutions should occur.  As an example of elimination, GPS provides better 
routes and aids in finding rest stops, which decreases navigation time and eliminates non-value-
added time for drivers.   Substitution, for instance, can be accomplished when fleet managers 
provide schedules to drivers, expedite loading/unloading, and manage maintenance times – 
ensuring minimal driver downtime.  Suitably, the tactics of substitution and elimination may be 
critical for understanding the impact of HOS on the perishable time of truck drivers.   
Having a plan is an important part of being able to carry out the tactics of elimination or 
substitution.  Amorim et al. (2012) advocate the importance of a longer-term plan versus 
reactively dealing with the current problems of perishable goods.  Perishable items can falsely 
necessitate action.  Because the perishable items lose value and ultimately become a liability, 
focusing solely on the present can lead to greater losses through the replication of the same 
problems in future time periods (Amorim et al., 2012).  Planning often results in better 
scheduling.  Siferd et al. (1992) emphasized the importance of scheduling strategies to managers 
in service capacity planning.  Truck companies must optimize profits by balancing the number of 
drivers and tractors needed to fulfill demand.  When HOS changes, so do the workable hours for 
drivers thus, necessitating a change in the number of truck drivers in order to sustain the same 
service level (Holcomb et al. 2014; Min 2009b).  A look at planning-related investments made 
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by trucking companies may enable a better perspective of HOS regulation impact on the truck 
driving industry.   
A good plan needs to allow flexibility to account for unknowns (Kishore et al. 2011) 
especially with regards to perishable goods (Roy, Kar, & Maiti, 2010).  While planning truck 
drivers’ perishable time, managers should consider providing flexibility to their drivers to 
account for breaks, construction and congestion delays, longer than expected unload or upload 
times, and breakdown of equipment; otherwise, a decrease in overall service level is more likely 
(M. R. Crum & Morrow 2002; Adams-Guppy & Guppy 2003).  HOS regulations limit the 
flexibility of drivers, which has sometimes led to decreased safety (Jensen & Dahl 2009).  
Flexibility, correspondingly, is perhaps an important tactic for improving the overall service 
level of truck drivers and for understanding the safety implications of HOS regulations on truck 
drivers. 
First- in-first out (FIFO) and last-in-first out (LIFO) are two different strategies employed 
in perishable inventory theory (Nahmias 1982).  Using the oldest units first, (FIFO) minimizes 
the expected obsolescence, but increases the average age of the product, while conversely, using 
newer units first (LIFO) decreases the average age of the products being delivered, while often 
leading to more obsolescence (Nahmias 1982).  Let us use two drivers as an example.  Driver 1 
has already accumulated driving hours, while Driver 2 has not driven in the current time period. 
As a long route becomes available, a LIFO approach would use Driver 2 because Driver 1 does 
not have enough HOS time remaining to complete the route.  For a shorter route, a FIFO 
approach could utilize the remaining HOS of Driver 1, ensuring non-obsolescence, thus saving 
Driver 2 for future routes. Therefore, the tactics of FIFO and LIFO can be used in realizing 
greater utility of truck drivers. 
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When dealing with perishable goods, managers need to be aware that not all of the goods 
deteriorate at the same rate or become obsolete at the same time.  This is the concept of 
heterogeneity.  Heterogeneous products that have not expired are not of equal utility or value 
(Nahmias 1982).  Truck drivers should be considered heterogeneous because they do not have 
the same capability to manage their fatigue; thus they deteriorate at different rates.  Obesity, age, 
and overall health are some of the factors that increase driver fatigue (McCartt et al. 2000; 
FMSCA 2015).  For example, Stoohs et al. (1994) showed that obese truck drivers were twice as 
likely to have an accident as non-obese drivers.  Research has also found that younger drivers 
(Summala & Mikkola 1994; Horne & Burley 2010), and older drivers (Wang & McDonald 2004; 
Mitler et al. 1997; McGwin Jr & Brown 1999) are associated with deteriorated skills due to 
fatigue.  In essence, truck drivers’ time cards or Electronic on Board Recorders (EOBR) may be 
the same, but they may offer different performance levels of service and safety.  
Correspondingly, heterogeneity can be used to understand the possible HOS implications on 
truck drivers’ perishable time.  
Perishable goods are categorized as one of the most difficult inventory problems due to 
their limited life, loss of revenue due to deterioration and obsolescence, cost of disposal, and 
increased likelihood of stock out (Kishore et al. 2011).  In order to manage these challenges, the 
following tactics were extracted from the perishable research literature and are used in this 
research to investigate the implications of HOS on the truck driving industry: capacity 
utilization, substitution and/or elimination, planning, flexibility, FIFO and LIFO, and 
heterogeneity. 
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Hours of Service Background 
Federal Motor Safety Carrier Association (FMSCA) establishes HOS regulations for 
truck drivers.  These regulations stipulate the maximum duty and driving hours of truck drivers.  
Moreover, HOS rules limit both daily and weekly duty and driving hours of truck drivers.  
Government agencies have stated that regulation in the trucking industry is important because of 
the increased potential of an accident that occurs as truck drivers work additional hours (FMSCA 
2015).  Soccolich et al., (Soccolich et al. 2013) discussed the increased rate of safety incident 
occurrences based on accumulating driving time (see Figure 6).  This figure shows that truck 
drivers become more of a safety liability as they reach higher driving hours.  Previous research 
has also filled gaps regarding the source of truck driver accidents.  Most of this research has 
measured the effects of singular restrictions and accidents with respect to fatigue, some examples 
of effects include: multi-day driving patterns (Kaneko & Jovanis 1992), starting fatigue level (M. 
R. Crum & Morrow 2002), driving hours per day (Hanowski et al. 2009; Soccolich et al. 2013), 
driving time of day (Blower & Campbell 1998), breaks (Chen & Xie 2014a), sleeper-berths 
(Hertz 1988), truck miles (Lyman & Braver 2003; Joshua & Garber 1990; Jovanis & Chang 
1986), and truck driver health (Anderson et al. 2012).  These types of research efforts have been 
influential in changes that have been made to HOS regulations in the past.  The following section 
provides a historical perspective of some of these changes. 
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History of Hours of Service (HOS) 
Figure 6 Incident rate and driving hour (Soccolich et al., 2013) 
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The Motor Carrier Act of 1935 authorized the Interstate Commerce Commission to 
regulate commercial motor vehicles.  In 1938, HOS was enacted with six main provisions  (see 
Table 4) (“Federal Register, Volume 65 Issue 85”, 2000).  Shortly after the first HOS release, 
there were two provisions and two redactions in 1939.  The next change occurred in 1962, 
removing the duty cycle provision.  In 2003, three changes were made and regulators added two 
new rules, a sleeper berth provision, and a restart provision.  In 2005, there was one change 
regarding the minimum number of hours authorized in a sleeper berth.  In 2013, there were three 
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new laws added: one stipulated a mandatory break within the first 8 hours of duty, and two 
restricted the use of the restart provision.  In 2014, these two restart provisions were removed 
pending reevaluation (FMSCA 2015).  The number of HOS changes is reflected graphically in 
Figure 7.  Out of the total 23 changes, additions, or redactions; nearly half (11) of them have 
occurred since 2003, indicating that the past decade has been particularly disruptive and 
Year Changed 1938 1939 1962 2003 2005 2013 2014
Driving Hours 12 10 10 11 11 11 11
On-Duty Hours 15 N/A
N/A
14 14 14 14
Max Daily 
Work
12 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Off-Duty 
Hours
9 8 8 10 10 10 10
Duty Cycle 24 24 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
60 Hour (7-day) 60 60 60 60 60 60 60
70 Hour (8-day) 70 70 70 70 70 70 70
Break ≥8 ≥8
Restart ≥34 ≥34 ≥34 ≥34 
Number of 
Restarts
1 Per 168 
Hrs
N/A
1 am to 5 am ≥2 N/A
Sleeper Berths 
Split Sleep
≥2 hrs ≥8 hrs ≥8 hrs ≥8 hrs
Changes 7 4 1 5 1 3 2
Table 4 History of HOS 
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uncertain for the trucking industry.  The following section provides specific details concerning 
HOS regulations that have been relevant since 2013. 
Recent Hours of Service Regulations 
Since 2013, the relevant daily HOS regulations mandated that truck drivers cannot drive 
more than 11 hours per day, cannot be on duty for more than 14 hours per day and must have a 
30-minute break within the first 8 hours of duty (FMSCA 2015).  The weekly HOS regulations 
further restrict the daily HOS regulations.  Truck drivers can either utilize a maximum of 70 duty 
hours within 8-days (if the company he/she is driving for operates 7-days a week) or 60 duty 
hours within 7-days (if the company he/she is driving for operates 6 or fewer days per week).  
One other regulation within HOS is the restart provision.  The restart provision allows the truck 
driver to rest for a certain period, thereby resetting all duty and driving hours back to zero.  The 
July 1, 2013 HOS update limited restart uses to 1 restart per 168 hours restriction or 1 per week.  
It also stipulated that the restart must last at least 34 hours and must coincide with two full 1 am 
Figure 7 Number of HOS Changes 
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to 5 am periods (FMSCA 2015). The December 14, 2014 HOS update removed these restart 
limitations, except for the 34-hour provision. 
The goal of the July 1, 2013 HOS update was to decrease extensive working hours, 
thereby reducing fatigue-related crashes and long-term health problems for truck drivers 
(FMSCA 2015).  The Federal Motor Safety Carrier Association (FMSCA) predicted that this rule 
would decrease acute and chronic fatigue while only cutting work hours by 15 percent (2015).  
In 2013 there were 342,000 crashes, 95,000 injuries, and 3,964 fatalities  involving trucks 
(NHTSA 2015).  The regulatory policy proposed was anticipated to prevent 1,400 crashes (a 
reduction of .41 percent), 560 injuries (a reduction of .59 percent), and 19 deaths (a reduction of 
.48 percent) involving trucks per year (FMSCA 2015).  The 2013 updated HOS rules have come 
under scrutiny due to unintended consequences (Ferro 2014), higher associated costs than 
estimated (Short 2013), and shortcomings regarding methodologies utilized to evaluate HOS 
changes (Goel 2014; Brewster & Short 2014).  This dissertation research provides additional 
insight into this ongoing discussion.  
Method 
This research builds upon previous research by viewing the impact of HOS regulations 
on truck drivers through the lens of perishable inventory theory.  HOS regulations restrict the 
hours that truck drivers can operate, as such, this research primarily analyzes the capacity 
differences of these provisions.  In order to understand the capacity differences in the various 
HOS regulations, MATLAB v8.4 simulation was first utilized for the analysis of capacity 
differences due to its coding flexibility in discrete modeling (Grewal & Andrews 2014).  This 
approach provided a general solution for most situations; however, due to the difficult 
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interactions of constraints (weekly, daily, restarts, and breaks), the simulation missed some sub-
optimal solutions that were discovered using a different technique—Exhaustive Enumeration.  
Exhaustive Enumeration is a simple (yet very time-consuming) optimization approach that 
evaluates all the solutions for different combinations of discrete variables in order to identify the 
region of feasible solutions.  Utilizing a similar approach to Itti and Gokak (2013), the 
Exhaustive Enumeration (EE) method provided optimal discrete values for all possible HOS 
regulatory combinations.  Utilizing the values generated by the EE method, all optimum discrete 
points (average daily driving hours) were identified and graphed on a continuous scale.   
Since the majority of truck drivers are paid per mile (Short 2013), and driving hours is a 
good substitute for miles driven (Braver et al. 1999), this research used average daily driving 
hours.  Optimizing average daily driving hours enables comparisons, with respect to capacity, of 
the different interactive effect of HOS regulations (daily, weekly, and restart provisions).  Most 
previous studies use a daily view to look at the effects of long duty hours on a given day 
(Williamson et al. 1996; Hanowski et al. 2009; Soccolich et al. 2013; Chen & Xie 2014b).  Some 
previous studies use a weekly view to look at the compounding effects of multi-day operations on 
fatigue (Beilock 1995; Mackie & Miller 1978; Kaneko & Jovanis 1992).  Using this new 
approach of average daily hours allows the analysis to consider both a daily view and weekly 
view, but expresses the results in a way that is easy for truck drivers to understand their true 
capacity given all constraints caused by the regulations.  
Since truck drivers can increase average daily driving hours based on changing start and 
end times, certain classifications are needed in order to enumerate average daily driving hours.  
In the absence of HOS regulation, there are several reasons truck drivers would alter their 
schedules: personal preferences, traffic congestion, disparate speed limits that occur at night, and 
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pickup/delivery windows.  HOS regulations have created incentives for truck drivers to change 
their schedules to maximize their capacity in two ways.  First, since the 24-hour duty cycle (first 
introduced in 1938 and removed in 1962) no longer exists, truck drivers can currently change 
their daily schedules.  Second, truck drivers have an incentive to alter their weekly schedules at 
the beginning or end of the week to optimize the restart time based upon the 1 am to 5 am 
provision.  Because of these different options created by the HOS regulations, this analysis 
utilizes an approach similar to that of Murray and Short (2015) and considers three different 
classifications types of drivers: 1) truck drivers that have no schedule changes, 2) truck drivers 
that have weekly schedule changes (at the start or end of each weekly time period), and 3) truck 
drivers that have daily schedule changes.  The relevant HOS provisions used in this analysis (and 
their corresponding lines on HOS logbooks) are discussed in the following paragraphs.   
The daily HOS regulations restrict the amount of driving and duty time and require 
breaks and rest time (constraints shown below).  Driving time is restricted to 11 hours per period.  
Duty time is restricted to 14 hours per period, starts at the beginning of a shift, and accumulates 
continuously until being reset by 10 consecutive off-duty hours.  A 30-minute break is required 
in any given 8-hour duty period.  For purposes of the analysis, the daily restrictions are 
expressed mathematically as follows: 
Driving Time ≤ 11 hours 
Duty Time ≤ 14 Hours 
Consecutive Hours Off Duty ≥ 10 Hours 
Break ≥ 30 Minutes (if duty time is ≥ 8 consecutive hours) 
 
Unlike daily HOS regulations, weekly HOS regulations only restrict duty hours.  The 70 
duty hours over 8 days or 60 duty hours over 7 days provisions prescribe the maximum amount 
of hours that can be attained during that timeframe without a restart being used.  A truck driver is 
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under the 70-hour provision if the company he/she is driving for operates 7 days per week, and is 
under the 60-hour provision if the company operates 6 or fewer days per week.  While any break 
time counts against the 14-hour duty clock mentioned above, it does not count towards weekly 
duty time provisions. Only duty or driving time count towards these 8-day or 7-day hours; 
meaning that break times during the day count only against the 14-hour clock.  These weekly 
restrictions lead to the following additional mathematical expressions:  
Duty Time ≤ 60 hours (for 7 day period) 
Duty Time ≤ 70 hours (for 8 day period) 
The final set of mathematical expressions that are necessary for the analysis involve 
restarts.  The restart provision before July 1, 2013 allowed for an unlimited number of restarts 
and required a consecutive 34-hour break.  From July 1, 2013 to December 16, 2014 the restart 
provision still required a consecutive 34-hour break; but also mandated that the break period 
include two consecutive 1 am to 5 am periods and also limited the number of restarts to 1 restart 
per 168 hours restriction.  In this analysis, when the 1 am to 5 am provision is used it is in 
combination with the 1 restart per 168 hours restriction.  The restart-related restrictions are 
stated mathematically as: 
Restart ≥ 34 hours 
Restart Number < 1 per 168-hours  
Restart = 2 consecutive nights (1 am to 5 am) 
 The Exhaustive Enumeration (EE) method was based on maximizing truck-driver 
driving time.  This was accomplished using a layered approach by first optimizing daily driving 
hours, followed by accounting for the 70-hour (8-day) or 60-Hour (7-day) constraints, and then 
by considering the different restart constraints (Unlimited, 1 restart per 168 hours restriction, and 
1 restart per 168 hours restriction with the 1 am to 5 am provision (see Figure 8).  The discrete 
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values used in EE to optimize driver capacity were based on the smallest time restriction – the 
mandatory 30 minute break.  Thus, 48 different start times were analyzed starting at 00:00 and 
ending at 23:30.  This study examines and compares the maximum average daily driving hours 
that a truck driver can operate under the different restrictions and helps illustrate the implications 
of the perishable inventory theory tactics.  
 
In addition to the above considerations, the analysis also accounts for the effects of 
congestion on average daily driving hours.  Congestion and the 1 am to 5 am provision create 
preferred driving times.  In order to generalize the effects of congestion, this research utilized the 
buffer index (BI).  BI was used in the 2011 Congested Corridors Report (Eisele et al. 2011) and 
ensures 95 percent on time rate by adding additional “buffer time” to the schedule or route based 
on statistical data gathered from 328 different traffic corridors across the country.  The 328 
different traffic corridors Buffer Indexes are averaged in order to provide the best sample for 
Figure 8 Layered Aspects of HOS 
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approximating congestion across America.  Since traffic congestion varies by location, a 
sensitivity analysis from zero to 260 percent BI is applied. 
Analysis 
The analysis calculates average daily driving hours under several different scenarios to 
determine capacity utilization.  Since truck drivers predominantly operate under the 70-hour 
provision, most of the analysis uses the 70-hour constraint
1
.  The first section analyzes truck 
drivers that have no schedule changes except those immediately following a change to a given 
HOS regulation.  Truck drivers that have weekly schedule changes (at the start or end of each 
weekly time period) are addressed in the second section, followed by a section addressing truck 
drivers that have daily schedule changes.  The final section provides the mathematical rationale 
for the unintended consequences of increased congestion due to the 1 am to 5 am provision.  
No Change in Truck Driver Schedule 
Some truck drivers operate on regular, stable, and consistent schedules that do not 
fluctuate from day-to-day or from week-to-week (no schedule changes).  When HOS regulations 
are changed, these drivers may alter their schedules to adapt to the new provisions, but will then 
                                                 
 
 
 
1
 The average daily driving hours are lower for the 60-hour restriction and there are similar patterns in the results except for one 
aspect – 168 hours equals 7 days, thus the 60-hour (7-day) restriction falls within the same time period as the 1 restart per 168 
hours, eliminating any restart benefit.   
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maintain the revised schedule going forward.  Although a truck driver can drive fewer than 11 
hours per day, Figure 9 shows the maximum average daily driving hours that can be achieved 
under various HOS regulations and highlights the points of divergence, which are created by 
these restrictions.  All restrictions equate to the same average daily driving hours up to 9.25 
hours of duty per day (.5 hours for a break and 8.75 hours of driving).  The 8-day (70-hour) rule 
begins to diverge the amount of average daily driving hours that can be achieved and limits the 
average daily driving to 8.75 hours (70 hours ÷ 8 days = 8.75) until a restart occurs.  The next 
point of divergence occurs at 10.8 duty hours above which restarts provide greater average daily 
driving hours than the 70-hour restriction.   
The final divergence occurs at 12.5 duty hours and separates the unlimited restart 
provision from the 1 restart per 168 hours restriction and 1 am to 5 am provision.  Under the 
unlimited restart provision, a truck driver can begin a restart period at any time.  Under the 1 
restart per 168 hours restriction a driver can still begin a restart at any time, but taking a restart at 
any point prior to 134 duty hours will translate into a restart period being longer than the 
minimum required 34 hours, thus leading to lower average daily driving hours.   
Table 2 shows that drivers cannot actually drive 11 hours on average per day (as a simple 
look at the HOS regulations might suggest).  Instead, 9.43 hours is the maximum average daily 
driving hours that can be achieved under any of the HOS regulations, assuming no schedule 
changes.  For purposes of calculating the maximum and average percent differences, only the 
points to the right of the first divergence are included.  The data points inside the shaded box are 
excluded because they are the same for all of the different provisions and restrictions.  The 70-
hour restriction is the most limiting in terms of average daily driving hours.  Under the daily 
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restrictions, a driver can see a 54.6 percent increase in average daily driving hours over what can 
be achieved under the 70-hour restriction.   
The analysis shows that restarts can be very beneficial in terms of improving average 
daily driving hours.  Table 5 shows that unlimited restart provision can improve daily driving 
averages significantly.  When compared to the 70-hour provision, the unlimited restart provision 
can increase daily driving averages by up to 28.6 percent.  However, there are substantial 
differences between the various restart provisions.  The unlimited restart provision yields a 12.5 
percent increase in average daily driving hours over the 1 restart per 168 hours restriction. 
As Figure 9 shows, improving the efficiency ratio (driving time ÷ duty time) greatly 
improves the number of average daily driving hours, which in turn affects capacity.  While the 
lines in this figure illustrate the maximum average daily driving hours that can be legally driven 
under the various restrictions and provisions, drivers can certainly achieve lower average daily 
driving hours that may be dictated by customer requirements.  After 12.17 daily duty hours 
(11.67 duty hours counted against the weekly 70-hour limit because of the 30 minute break), the 
truck driver begins to lose driving capacity.  This occurs because driving is limited to 11 hours 
per day, and adding more duty hours limits potential duty time on future days.  Specifically, for 
Table 5 Percent Difference between Restrictions and/or Provisions Assuming No Changes to a Truck Driver's 
Schedule 
Max % 
Differenc
Average 
% 14.6% 8.0%
28.6% 11.7%
54.3% 28.7%
12.5% 3.3%
35.0% 18.6%
20.0% 14.7%Unlimited Restart Provision Vs. Daily Restrictions
Comparison of Restrictions and/or Provisions  
70-Hour Restriction Vs. 1 Restart Per 168 Hour Provision 
70-Hour Restriction Vs. Unlimited Restart Provision
70-Hour Restriction Vs. Daily Restrictions
1 Restart Per 168 Hour Provision Vs. Unlimited Restart Provision
1 Restart Per 168 Hour Provision Vs. Daily Restrictions
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every minute of duty over 12.17 hours, a minute of driving is lost during one of the days left 
before the next restart period.  This demonstrates what can be accomplished by eliminating or 
substituting non-value added duty time (one of the tactics used to deal with perishability) thus 
ensuring maximum driving time and increasing the efficiency ratio.     
 
Weekly Change in Truck Driver Schedule 
Weekly schedule change refers to altering a truck driver’s end time on the day before the 
beginning of the restart and/or the start time on the day after the completion of the restart.  These 
Figure 9 Maximum Average Daily Driving Hours under Various HOS regulations for Drivers Following a Consistent 
Schedule 
Highlighted 
values are not 
used for percent 
differences shown 
in Table 2 
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two changes (which are a consequence of the 1 am to 5 am restart provision) are discussed in 
greater detail in the following paragraphs.   
Changing the end time on the day before the restart may enable a truck driver to decrease 
the duration of the restart, thus, increase average daily driving hours.  For instance, a truck driver 
who operates 14-duty hours per day and desires to avoid a restart that is longer than the required 
34 hours should begin operating between 5 am and 11 am, thus ending before 1 am (see Figure 
10 Timeline A).  This occurs because the 1 am to 5 am provision requires two complete and 
consecutive periods.  If a truck driver works past 1 am, the driver will not be able to count any 
portion of that 1 am to 5 am time period as part of their restart.  For example, if a truck driver 
begins at noon and stops at 2:00 am, the required restart duration would be 51 hours rather than 
34 hours that it could have been if the driver had stopped working at 1:00 am (see Figure 10 
Timeline C).  Increased restart hour duration can also occur if the truck driver ends too early, 
because additional hours of waiting are needed until the 5 am provision is reached.  For instance, 
if a truck driver begins his/her 14-hour duty day at 20:00 (8 pm) and ends at 10:00 the next day, 
the restart duration would be 43 hours (see Figure 10 Timeline B).  These two examples illustrate 
that the restart duration can change based upon the end time prior to the beginning of the restart 
period. 
After completing a restart, a truck driver can either choose to wait to start driving until 
his/her normal start time, or choose to begin driving immediately following the restart (at 5 am) 
and then maintain on that revised start time for the remainder of that duty week.  The choice they 
make, based on their preferences, can lead to what we have labeled a preference penalty, which, 
if incurred, decreases average daily driving hours. For example, if a truck driver begins at 20:00 
and ends at 10:00 (a 14-hour duty day), the driver’s restart duration is 43 hours (due to 2 
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complete and consecutive 1 am to 5 am periods) and then an additional 15 hours (from 05:00 to 
20:00) is needed to begin at the normal start time (see Figure 10 Timeline D).  A truck driver 
could actually begin driving immediately after the restart is complete at 5 am, thus, eliminating 
the addition 15 hours of preferred waiting time.  Figure 11 Timeline E provides a similar 
example of a preference penalty and also demonstrates that the sum of the restart period and the 
preference penalty durations ranges from 34 hours to 58 hours under a 14-hour duty day 
scenario.  As the restart period duration increases, the preference penalty duration decreases by 
the same amount. 
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Figure 10 Restart Duration Examples 
Figure 11 Preference Penalty Examples 
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Various equations were generated using the Exhaustive Enumeration (EE) method to 
better understand the relationship between the restart period and the preference penalty 
durations.  In order to maximize the average daily driving hours, a truck driver needs to 
minimize the restart period and preference penalty durations.  To do this, the driver must start 
within a specific time window.  This specific window and other relevant variables are defined 
mathematically as follows:  
Equations Group 1: Hours of Service Variables 
dutyPeriodHours = truck driver daily duty duration 
startTime = time truck driver starts duty 
startHours = the difference between 0 am and startTime 
restartHours = duration of restart period 
preferencePenaltyHours = length of delay due to driver preferred start time   
lostHours = restartHours + preferencePenaltyHours 
 
windowStartTime = 5 am 
windowHours = 20 hours – dutyPeriodHours 
windowEndTime = 5 am + windowHours  
 
The mathematical definitions above can be utilized to calculate restart period, preference 
penalty, and total hours as follows: 
Equations Group 2: Truck Driver Restart Hours 
     If windowEndTime ≥ startTime, then restartHours = 34 hours 
  
     If windowEndTime < startTime, then restartHours = (57 hours + windowHours) - startHours 
 
Equations Group 3: Truck Driver Preference Penalty Hours 
     If startTime ≥ 5 and If windowEndTime ≥ startTime, then preferencePenaltyHours = 14 hours – dutyPeriodHours 
 
     If startTime ≥ 5 and If windowEndTime < startTime, then preferencePenaltyHours = startHours – 5 hours 
 
     If startTime < 5 am, then preferencePenaltyHours = 19 hours + startHours    
 
Truck Driver Restart Hours & Truck Driver Preference Penalty: 
 
Equations Group 4: Truck Driver Restart and Preference Penalty Hours 
     If windowHours + 5 hours ≥ startHours, then totalHours = 48 hours – dutyPeriodHours  
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     If windowHours + 5 hours < startHours, then totalHours = 52 hours + windowHours  
 
These equations were utilized to construct Figure 12, which illustrates the total restart 
hours that correspond with various start and end times for truck drivers working 8, 11, or 14 duty 
hours per day.  In this figure, the bottom region represents the windowHours for the truck driver.  
If a truck driver begins his/her duty day outside the windowStartTime and windowEndTime 
(illustrated in Figure 12), the totalHours can increase by 71 percent (from 34 to 58 hours).   
  Further analysis illustrates the relationship between totalHours and the average daily 
driving hours (see Figure 13 and Table 6).  Since the truck driver can legally choose to incur a 
preference penalty, three different levels were created for average daily driving hours: low, 
medium and high.  Low indicates a truck driver having the longest restart period and preference 
penalty durations possible and therefore achieving the lowest possible average daily driving 
hours (operating outside the windowStartTime and windowEndTime).  Medium indicates the 
average totalHours for all of the 48 enumerated start and corresponding end times.  High 
indicates a truck driver operating within the windowStartTime and windowEndTime, thereby 
achieving the highest average daily driving hours under the 1 am to 5 am restart provision.   
Figure 12 1 am to 5 am Provision Start Times 
windowEnd windowStart 
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As shown in the Figure 13, utilizing a restart (under the 1 restart per 168 hours restriction 
and 1 am to 5 am provision) is not beneficial until the driver operates more than 10.7 hours on 
average within the first 6 days.  At 11.5 hours the maximum amount of average daily driving 
hours are achieved for all three categories 9.43 (high), 8.63 (medium), and 8.25 (low).  
  
Table 6 directly compares the maximum average daily driving hours that can be achieved 
under the various HOS regulations.  A truck driver under the 1 restart per 168 hour restriction 
and 1 am to 5 am provision low (see Table 6) drives a maximum of 10.2 percent less than a 1 
restart per 168 hour restriction and 1 am to 5 am provision medium, and a maximum of 14.6 
percent less than 1 restart per 168 hour restriction and 1 am to 5 am provision high.  
Figure 13 1 am to 5 am Provision and Average Daily Driving Hours 
Highlighted values are not 
used for percent differences 
shown in Table 3. 9.25 Duty 
Hours are used to compare 
values from Figure 8. 
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Furthermore, a truck driver in the 1 restart per 168 hours restriction and 1 am to 5 am provision 
low will drive 12.5 percent (max) and -1.5 percent (average) fewer hours than if he/she operated 
under the 70-hour provision only, and 28.6 percent (max) fewer hours than using the unlimited 
restart provision.  This indicates that there are numerous schedules that will never benefit from 
using a restart under the 1 restart per 168 hours restriction and 1 am to 5 am provision; restricting 
the truck drivers to the 70-hour restriction and indicating a large impact to trucking capacity for 
these schedules.  Conversely, for the 1 restart per 168 hour restriction and 1 am to 5 am provision 
medium there is an increase of 10.2 percent over the 70-hour restriction, indicating that the 
restart is indeed beneficial.   
The different restart provisions and associated average daily driving hours illustrate large 
capacity changes, which provide equally large incentives for truck drivers to alter their weekly 
schedules to increase capacity through the perishability tactics of proper planning, flexibility, and 
heterogeneity.  The next section analyzes daily changes to a truck driver’s schedule that can 
increase capacity even more.  
Note: Daily Driving indicates the 14-hour duty restriction, 30-minute break requirement, and 11-hour driving restriction.  70-Hour indicates the 
layering of the daily driving restrictions and the 70-hour (8-day) restriction.  Unlimited indicates the layering of the daily driving restrictions, the 
Table 6 Comparison of Restrictions and/or Provisions Assuming No and/or Moderate Truck Driver Schedule 
Changes Max % 
Difference
Average % 
Difference
12.5% 1.9%
10.2% 4.2%
14.6% 9.8%
28.6% 12.2%
54.3% 29.8%
10.2% 2.4%
14.6% 7.8%
28.6% 10.2%
54.3% 27.4%
9.8% 5.3%
16.7% 7.5%
40.0% 24.2%
12.5% 2.1%
35.0% 17.8%
20.0% 15.3%
1 Restart Per 168 Hour Restriction and 1 am to 5 am (Medium) Vs. Daily Restrictions
1 Restart Per 168 Hour Restriction and 1 am to 5 am (High) Vs. Unlimited Restart Provision
1 Restart Per 168 Hour Restriction and 1 am to 5 am (High) Vs. Daily Restrictions
Unlimited Restart Provision Vs. Daily Restrictions
70-Hour Restriction Vs. 1 Restart Per 168 Hour Restriction and 1 am to 5 am (Medium)
70-Hour Restriction Vs. 1 Restart Per 168 Hour Restriction and 1 am to 5 am (High)
70-Hour Restriction Vs. Unlimited Restart Provision
70-Hour Restriction Vs. Daily Restrictions
1 Restart Per 168 Hour Restriction and 1 am to 5 am (Medium) Vs. 1 Restart Per 168 Hour Restriction and 1 am to 5 am (High)
1 Restart Per 168 Hour Restriction and 1 am to 5 am (Medium) Vs. Unlimited Restart Provision
1 Restart Per 168 Hour Restriction and 1 am to 5 am (Low) Vs. Daily Restrictions
Comparison of Restrictions and/or Provisions  
1 Restart Per 168 Hour Restriction and 1 am to 5 am (Low) Vs. 70-Hour Restriction
1 Restart Per 168 Hour Restriction and 1 am to 5 am (Low) Vs. 1 Restart Per 168 Hour Restriction and 1 am to 5 am (Medium)
1 Restart Per 168 Hour Restriction and 1 am to 5 am (Low) Vs. 1 Restart Per 168 Hour Restriction 1 am to 5 am (High)
1 Restart Per 168 Hour Restriction and 1 am to 5 am (Low) Vs. Unlimited Restart Provision
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70-hour (8-day) restriction, and the unlimited restart provision.  168 Low, 168 Medium, and 168 High indicates the layering of the daily driving 
restrictions, 70-hour (8-day) restriction, and the 1 restart per 168 hours restriction with the 1 am to 5 am provision.   
 
  Daily Change in a Truck Driver Schedule 
Although it is unlikely that a truck driver would change his/her schedule daily for a 
lengthy time period (multiple weeks or months), it is likely that under the right incentives a truck 
driver would change his/her schedule daily for a shorter period (multiple days or a week).  
Change to daily driving start times can increase average daily driving hours dramatically because 
it capitalizes on the fact that there is no 24-hour cycle mandate.  For example, a truck driver can 
legally be on duty for 12 hours, accomplishing 11 hours of driving, sleep for 10 hours and then 
begin again after 22 hours have passed.  This will allow a truck driver to begin duty again 2 
hours prior to their previous start time and enable the truck driver to accumulate more average 
daily driving hours.  By having daily schedule changes, it is possible to drive an average of 10.35 
hours per day (a 9.8 percent increase over not making daily schedule changes) under the 
unlimited restart provision – the highest possible driving hours that can be legally achieved (see 
Figure 9 and Figure 14).  Although less than the hours accumulated under the unlimited restart 
provision, the 1 restart per 168 hours restriction also increases the average daily driving hours to 
10 hours from 9.43 hours.  No increase in average daily driving hours is achieved under only the 
70-hour restriction.   
As Table 7 illustrates, the unlimited restart provision offers 32.2 percent higher average 
daily driving hours than the 70-hour (8-day) restriction; 20.2 percent higher average daily driving 
hours than the 1 restart per 168 hour restriction (low), and up to a 15.7 percent higher average 
daily driving hours than the 1 restart per 168 hour restriction (medium and high).   
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Although capacity is increased, there are dramatic changes to the daily schedule, 
which impact a truck driver’s circadian rhythm.  At the highest average daily driving hours, 
11.5 hours duty and 11 hours of driving, a truck driver would begin to drive 2.5 hours earlier 
than his/her previous start time.  After 6 cycles (66 hours of driving) a truck driver would 
have swapped his/her scheduled start time by 12.5 hours.  A truck driver could also switch 
their cycle by a lesser amount, but it would still have a cumulative impact on his/her 
circadian rhythm.   
  
Figure 14 Daily Change in Truck Driver Schedule  
 Highlighted values are not used for percent 
differences shown in Table 4.  6-duty hour per 
period equates to 9-duty hours per day.  
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Comparison of Daily Schedule and No Schedule Changes 
As already mentioned, daily schedule changes correspond to increased average daily 
driving hours.  The magnitude of the differences between four scenarios representing no 
schedule changes and daily schedule changes are illustrated in Figure 15.  At 10.5 hours of 
duty, a daily schedule-changing driver achieves 14.3 percent more (10 versus 8.75) hours of 
average daily driving under both the unlimited restart provision and 1 per 168 restart 
restriction compared to the unlimited restart provision for a driver with no schedule changes. 
Figure 11 also reveals that a daily schedule-changing driver operating under the 1 restart per 
168 hour restriction will achieve more daily driving hours than the unlimited restart provision 
under no schedule changes for less than 12.2 duty hours.  Thus, there is a significant increase 
in capacity through daily schedule changes, especially when compared to no schedule 
changes.  A truck driver operating under no schedule changes, the 1 restart per 168 hour 
restriction, and 1 am to 5 am provision (low) experiences a 29 percent (max) decrease in 
capacity at 10.9 duty hours when compared to the unlimited restart provision and the 1 restart 
per 168 hours restriction and 1 to 5 am provision under daily schedule changes.  
Table 7 Daily Changes in Truck Driver Schedule 
Max % 
Difference
Average % 
Difference
10.0% 3.4%
14.3% 8.7%
14.3% 10.9%
32.2% 16.3%
54.3% 37.1%
6.7% 5.2%
10.4% 7.4%
20.2% 12.3%
40.2% 32.3%
3.8% 2.1%
15.7% 6.8%
35.0% 25.8%
15.7% 4.7%
35.0% 23.4%
21.0% 17.8%
70-Hour Restriction Vs. Daily Restrictions 
Comparison of Restrictions and/or Provisions  
70-Hour Restriction Vs. 1 Restart Per 168 Hour Restriction and 1 am to 5 am (Low)
70-Hour Restriction Vs. 1 Restart Per 168 Hour Restriction and 1 am to 5 am (Medium)
70-Hour Restriction Vs. 1 Restart Per 168 Hour Restriction and 1 am to 5 am (High)
70-Hour Restriction Vs. Unlimited Restart Provision
1 Restart Per 168 Hour Restriction and 1 am to 5 am (Medium) Vs. Daily Restrictions
1 Restart Per 168 Hour Restriction and 1 am to 5 am (High) Vs. Unlimited Restart Provision
1 Restart Per 168 Hour Restriction and 1 am to 5 am (High) Vs. Daily Restrictions
Unlimited Restart Provision Vs. Daily Restrictions
1 Restart Per 168 Hour Restriction and 1 am to 5 am (Low)  Vs. 1 Restart Per 168 Hour Restriction and 1 am to 5 am (Medium)
1 Restart Per 168 Hour Restriction and 1 am to 5 am (Low)  Vs. 1 Restart Per 168 Hour Restriction and 1 am to 5 am (High)
1 Restart Per 168 Hour Restriction and 1 am to 5 am (Low)  Vs. Unlimited Restart Provision
1 Restart Per 168 Hour Restriction and 1 am to 5 am (Low)  Vs. Daily Restrictions
1 Restart Per 168 Hour Restriction and 1 am to 5 am (Medium) Vs. 1 Restart Per 168 Hour Restriction and 1 am to 5 am (High)
1 Restart Per 168 Hour Restriction and 1 am to 5 am (Medium) Vs. Unlimited Restart Provision
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This section reveals large incentives for truck drivers to increase their efficiency and 
reduce the cycle period duration in order to capture higher average daily driving hours.  
However, these incentives come with daily schedule changes, potential fatigue, and higher 
chance of an accident based on the heterogeneity capabilities (perishable concept) of the 
truck driver.   
Congestion 
The last section of the analysis details the implications of the 1 am to 5 am provision 
and one of its unintended consequences—increased congestion due to an increased incentive 
to drive during daylight hours (Short 2013; Ferro 2014).  The analysis above has 
demonstrated that average daily driving hours can be increased when a truck driver operates 
Figure 15 Daily Schedule Changes Vs. No Schedule Changes 
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within the optimal time frame (which for a 14-hour duty day, involves starting to drive 
between 5 am and 11 am).  The more drivers who choose to operate within this optimal time 
frame, the more congestion is created, leading to decreased driving efficiency in terms of the 
distance that can be traveled during a given time period.  This section analyzes the tradeoffs 
between driving during the optimal time frame (and facing increased congestion levels, thus 
reducing the overall miles driven) or driving outside the optimal time frame (and facing the 
consequences of increased restart duration and preference penalty hours which decrease 
average daily driving hours and thus the overall miles driven). 
Congestion is the result of many factors: economic trends, weather, accidents, work 
zones, disparate speeds, and road capacity (Short and Murray, 2014).  It is important to note 
that a truck increases congestion more than a car because of the increased size, decreased 
maneuverability, increased driving spacing, lower driving speed, and decreased acceleration 
capability (Kaisy, Jung, and Rakha, 2007).  Research has shown that, in non-congested 
traffic, trucks are equivalent to 1.5 cars on a level freeway, 2.5 on a rolling freeway, and 4.5 
on a mountainous freeway (HCM, 2000).  Recent research has shown that these values are 
low when considering the effects of congestion, or stop-and-go traffic.  For example, Kaisy 
et al. (2001) found that trucks account for 2.5 cars on a level freeway during congested hours; 
a 66 percent increase from a non-congested level freeway.   
The 2011 Congested Corridors Report (CCR) establishes two different main 
congested periods, 6 to 10 am and 3 to 7 pm.  During these congested periods, traffic speeds 
are reduced.  Since the majority of truck drivers are paid per mile, their hourly driving is not 
as efficient in congestion.  The CCR provides a buffer index (BI) (ranging from 10 to 260 
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percent) that can be used for planning purposes to ensure an on-time arrival rate of 95 percent 
when driving in congested traffic (see Figure 16 and the following equation).   
 
Equation 5: Congestion and Hours of Service Penalty Hours 
      totalLostHours = restartHours + preferencePenaltyHours + congestionLostHours 
 
If a truck driver starts driving at 6 am and drives for 11 hours he/she drives during 
two main congestion periods (6 am to 10 am and 3 pm to 5 pm) for a total of 6 hours or 55 
percent (6/11) of the time.  Utilizing a BI of 100 percent, what would normally take 3 hours 
now incurs 3 congestionLostHours (for a total of 6 hours) due to the congestion.  Therefore, 
after driving 5 days, this schedule produces 15 lost hours.  However, starting at 7 pm (19:00) 
this schedule produces zero lost hours after 5 days because no congestion periods are 
encountered.   
Figure 16 Congestion Lost Hours (Five 11-Hour days) 
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Figure 17 illustrates the rationale for truck drivers to ultimately switch to daytime 
schedules in order to minimize totalLostHours.  Even a start time of 6 am with a BI of 260 
percent has approximately four fewer totalLostHours than starting at 7 pm.  Increasing 
congestion during the day, however, has many safety, economic, and environmental 
implications.   
Discussion 
This section ties the analytical results above to the tactics from perishable inventory 
theory (capacity utilization, flexibility, substitution and/or elimination, FIFO and LIFO, and 
long-term plan) and discusses implications for truck drivers.   
Figure 17 Congestion and 1 am to 5 am provision 
 
81 
 
Capacity Utilization 
Capacity utilization was measured by finding the maximum average daily driving 
hours under the different restrictions and provisions.  The different restrictions and 
provisions along with the schedules of truck drivers (no, weekly, and daily schedule changes) 
were shown to have significant differences in capacity (see Table 6 and Table 7, and Figure 
9, Figure 12, Figure 14 Figure 15).   
 Limiting how much a truck driver can drive has many ripple effects on the truck 
driving industry.  When hours are changed for truck drivers, the balance between the number 
of tractors and drivers, distribution nodes, and support personnel change.  For example, the 1 
restart per 168 hours and 1 am to 5 am provision was found to significantly decrease the 
amount of driving by up to 28.6 percent (see Table 6).  Since drivers could not operate as 
many hours, and companies desired to maintain the same service level, additional tractors, 
trailers and drivers were needed (Short 2013).  Unfortunately, 80.1 percent of respondents 
from that study still indicated loss of productivity, even with the additional equipment and 
personnel.  The addition of new equipment and hiring of new drivers have subsequent safety 
implications that are discussed more under the flexibility tactic. 
Capacity is not only based upon the hours of driving but how efficient that driving is 
with respect to miles traveled.  Congestion can restrict driving capacity further decreasing the 
miles driven by truck drivers than driving during non-congested periods.  This research has 
shown that under the 1 am to 5 am provision, truck drivers can paradoxically achieve the 
least amount of total lost driving hours (and thereby increase the total miles driven) by 
operating during the congested daytime periods.  By removing the 1 am to 5 am provision 
and operating under an unlimited restart provision, drivers would be able to drive more 
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during uncongested time periods and thereby achieve even more miles.  Research has shown 
that traffic flow was the single most important factor (more than circadian rhythm) in 
determining accident rate (Dingus et al. 2006).  Moreover, higher disparity of speed 
differences between vehicle types has also been shown to increase accident rates, due to the 
acceleration and deceleration differences between large and small vehicles in congestion 
(Neeley & Richardson 2009).  Basically, as congestion increases, the rate of accidents also 
increases (Kononov et al. 2008).  Campbell (1995) suggested providing incentives for truck 
drivers to operate outside the congested periods in order to ameliorate the effect of increased 
congestion.  However, FMSCA’s 1 am to 5 am provision, resulted in the opposite by 
providing drivers an incentive to drive more during congested periods, which only adds to 
the congestion levels and possible related safety consequences (Commerce Appropriations 
Act, 2014).   
Unfortunately, there are more negative impacts that result from the 1 am to 5 am 
provision such as increased CO2 emissions.  Operating a vehicle at lower average speeds 
because of  more braking, accelerating, and idle time not only causes more wear on the 
equipment and subsequent higher disposal rates, but it also has a large environmental impact 
due to increased CO2 emissions (Campbell 1995; Golias 2015; Figliozzi 2011). 
Flexibility 
HOS regulations are intended to restrict the hours that truck drivers can work or 
drive, thus, limiting their flexibility in several ways.  Three of which will be discussed here.  
First, the analysis above has shown that the continuously accumulating 14-hour duty day 
restriction limits the choices that drivers can make (such as whether or not to take a nap) 
which can limit their capacity and consequently their ability to earn money.  Evidence has 
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shown that naps result in a lower accident rate and improved work performance (Macchi et 
al. 2002; Philip et al. 2006).  Without the pressure created by the continuously accumulating 
duty hour restriction, drivers are free to nap when they are fatigued and drive when they feel 
rested.  The continuously accumulating aspect of the restriction, creates a negative incentive 
for drivers to nap.  Every minute a driver spends preparing for or taking a nap is a minute of 
their duty day that is lost and the rest of the week’s schedule can be severely influenced due 
to the continuously accumulating duty hour restriction and the 10-hour break following the 
14-hour limit.  For example, a driver who takes a rest for 2 hours may no longer reach the 
desired location within the 14-hour window, which causes a delay of greater than 10 hours 
due to the mandatory 10-hour break.  This decision to nap, therefore, can also influence the 
rest of the week’s schedule through the loss or modification of future loads.  As shown in this 
example, the continuously accumulating 14-hour duty restriction can provide large 
disincentives for truck drivers to take a nap or rest during their duty day.  In fact, the majority 
of drivers who fall asleep reported that they were aware of their fatigue but continued to 
drive (Abrams et al. 1997).  Furthermore, if the continuously accumulating aspect of the 
daily duty limit was removed, some truck drivers could avoid high congestion periods (6 to 
10 am and 3 to 7 pm) by taking naps.  This would not only reduce congestion, but increase 
truck driver’s capacity due to a decrease in the total hours (see totalLossHours in Figure 17).   
Second, the weekly provisions, including the 1 restart per 168 hours restriction and 1 
am to 5 am provision (low) has been shown (see Table 6) in this analysis to decrease capacity 
by 28.6 percent (max) when compared to the unlimited restart provision and 14.6 percent 
(max) when compared to the 1 restart per 168 hour restriction and 1 am to 5 am provision 
(high).  This decrease in capacity was the result of the increased restart duration and 
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preference penalty hours from not starting a truck driver’s day between 5 am and 11 am for a 
14-hour duty day.  Thus, this restriction and provision decreases the flexibility of times that 
truck drivers can maintain a certain capacity or service level.  Furthermore, under the 1 am to 
5 am provision, this research illustrated that truck drivers achieve higher driving efficiency 
by operating during daytime hours even with a congestion BI of 260% or 3.6 times slower 
than normal traffic.   
The analysis above demonstrates why the OOIDA Foundation (2011) and Short 
(2014) found that a majority of drivers (approximately 79 percent) claimed that they lost 
flexibility in managing their schedule with their workload because of this restriction and 
provision; leading to driving during peak congested times as well as increased stress and 
fatigue levels.  This dissertation analysis furthers this previous research by providing the 
economic rationale for these previous findings.  For truck drivers who start between 5 am and 
11 am (for a 14-hour duty day), a restart can lead to an increase in average daily driving 
hours (see Figure 9, Figure 13Figure 14).  Whereas for truck drivers starting outside of the 5 
am to 11 am period (for 14-hour duty day) the 1 restart per 168 hour restriction and 1 am to 5 
am provision is not beneficial, which leads drivers to not use restarts unless a preference 
penalty is utilized: however, not using the preference penalty has ramifications on circadian 
rhythm.  Furthermore, truck drivers operating during any time period of the day, under the 
60-hour (7-day) restriction, do not benefit from a 1 restart per 168 hour restriction.  Thus, 
almost all of HOS regulations restrict the number of driving or duty hours within a given 
period, but the 1 am to 5 am provision restricts the time of day (when) at which driving and 
duty should occur through monetary incentives.   
 
85 
 
Third, flexibility is also critical for businesses to optimally manage their workforce 
and equipment in order to meet required service levels.  This research revealed that 23 total 
HOS regulations changes have occurred since 1938, and approximately half  of them (11) 
occurred since 2003 (see Figure 7 and Table 4).  These 11 changes were also significant with 
respect to the amount of average daily driving hours that can be achieved (see Table 4, Table 
5, Table 6, and Table 7).  This analysis demonstrates that the truck driving industry is in an 
uncertain and highly fluctuating regulatory environment.  Research has found that companies 
who increase flexibility, through adaptation of schedules in uncertain regulatory 
environments, tend to succeed  (Alexander 1991; Engau & Hoffmann 2011).   Companies 
have achieved flexibility by making the workforce less permanent (Rugman & Verbeke 
1998).  Hiring temporary drivers, renting equipment, or contracting jobs limits their risk and 
exposure in the event of an accident (Tikriti 2015) while also not risking heavy investments 
that may not amortize.  However, such practices have been shown to decrease safety due to 
recently hired truck drivers and their route unfamiliarity (Brown 1986; Staplin & Gish 2005; 
Belzer et al. 2014), different maintenance practices for leased equipment (Yeh et al. 2009). 
Thus, in addition to the fatigue aspects of safety, there are other safety-related, unintended 
consequences of HOS regulations. 
In summary, fatigue and accidents may not be reduced by regulatory policy because 
of the effects on truck driver flexibility; because increased flexibility has been found to 
increase driver safety (Mackie & Miller 1978; Griffin et al. 1992; Jensen & Dahl 2009).  
Flexible schedules increase truck safety by providing truck drivers and truck dispatchers 
ample time and choices to account for fatigue level, congestion, weather, and loading 
requirements (Braver et al 1992).   
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Substitution and/or Elimination 
As this research has shown, there are drastic differences in average daily driving 
hours under the different HOS regulations (see Figure 9, Figure 12 , Figure 13, and Figure 
14), which directly relates to miles driven.  Most truck drivers are paid by the mile, which is 
a major reason truck drivers prefer to not just be on duty, but to drive efficiently.  Similarly, 
truck companies need to move goods (a function of distance), which also directly relates to 
hours driven (Williamson and Friswell, 2013).  Generally, if truck drivers are on duty but not 
driving, they are loading or unloading their trucks.  There are strong economic pressures to 
minimize the loading and unloading times; and truck drivers are continually looking to 
hasten their loading and unloading times to eliminate the time spent not driving (Morrow & 
Crum 2004; Duke et al. 2010).  This can lead to less secure loads and possible safety 
implications (McKnight & Bahouth 2009).  For example, HOS regulations create pressure for 
drivers to focus on maximizing their precious driving time under a continuously 
accumulating 14-hour duty clock, by rushing loading and unloading times.  Such rushing can 
increase driver stress and fatigue.  The effects of driver involvement in loading/unloading are 
mixed: initially, alertness may be improved but these effects wear off quickly and contribute 
to greater driver fatigue, especially during long duty days (Barns, 2000).  Outsourcing these 
loading and unloading duties to someone other than the driver (as a form of substitution) may 
not only prevent improper loading, but may also decrease the overall fatigue of truck drivers; 
thereby, improving the performance of the truck driver’s perishable time.   
Truck drivers have seen a decrease in fatigue levels through other substitution effects.  
Information technology (IT) has enabled truck drivers to seamlessly take care of non-driving 
duties (Kettinger et al. 2012).  Some of these non-driving duties have already been 
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researched and indicate a growing trend of substitution: dispatcher communication and 
tracking systems for driver scheduling (Zohar et al. 2014); GPS technology for routes 
(Towns & Cobb 2012); and IT in truck parking (Sándor & Csiszár 2013).  IT substitutions 
are even more critical for truck drivers that approach their HOS limits and potentially 
become perishable (Woensel et al. 2007).  These IT substitutions have not only increased the 
efficiency of truck drivers perishable driving time, but they have also reduced the stress and 
fatigue that is associated with a higher potential for accidents (Min 2009b).  Our research 
indicates that substitution and or elimination tactic of perishability is therefore a critical 
component of increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of truck driver’s perishable time.   
 FIFO/LIFO 
The concepts of FIFO and LIFO can also increase the total capacity for truck drivers 
and truck driving companies.  Once truck drivers begin their duty day, it is critical that they 
are handled under the FIFO model because of the continuously accumulating 14-hour daily 
constraint.  FIFO minimizes the expected obsolescence. Research has found that 
implementing FIFO policies for perishable products can minimize expired items by as much 
as 40 percent (Broekmeulen & Donselaar 2007).  The results of this research reveal that this 
tactic may provide similar average daily driving hour benefits for truck drivers (a special 
type of perishable inventory).  Using FIFO allows drivers to attain the highest average daily 
driving times shown in Figure 9 Maximum Average Daily Driving Hours under Various 
HOS regulations for Drivers Following a Consistent Schedulewhereas using LIFO results in 
fewer hours but greater perishable time with respect to the individual.   
Sometimes, however, in order to ensure delivery of high valued goods, the policy of 
LIFO may be more appropriate. If the product has greater value than the perishable time of 
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the truck driver, it is appropriate to employ LIFO to ensure product delivery.  Less 
predictable factors such as weather, congestion, and maintenance issues necessitate utilizing 
a driver with the most available duty time in order to ensure timely delivery.   
Regulations can lead to increased fatigue by altering the utilization of FIFO and 
LIFO.  For example, the 1 restart per 168 hours restriction with the 1 am to 5 am provision 
was shown to provide great incentive to alter a schedule in order to minimize the total restart 
hours by 71 percent (see totalRestartHours Figure 12).  However, a restart does not 
necessarily indicate a well-rested driver. Our analysis has shown that compliance with the 
regulations and restrictions can lead to a significant change in a driver’s normal circadian 
rhythm.  These circadian rhythm changes can cause safe-driving-perishability in terms of 
fatigue well before they reach their duty or driving hour limitations.  Crum and Morrow 
(2002) found that the single most important factor in truck-related accidents was when the 
truck driver started the work week tired.  Thus, it is important to consider other variables 
(such as circadian rhythm swaps and fatigue) than simply how many driving hours or duty 
hours a driver has remaining when making FIFO and LIFO decisions.  
Heterogeneous: Not all drivers are created equal 
Perishability occurs in part due to HOS regulations but also because of a driver’s 
abilities.  As previously stated, even though truck drivers may have the same hours available, 
they may not perform their duties equally.  Studies have found that high body mass index 
(Wiegand et al. 2009), high blood pressure (Korelitz et al., 1993), and poor physical and 
mental shape (Taylor & Dorn 2006) all increase truck driver fatigue and the likelihood of an 
accident.  In fact, Stoohs et al. (1994) found that obese truck drivers (who have high rates of 
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sleep disorders) had a two-fold higher accident rate.  Because not all drivers are the same, it 
is paramount for drivers to understand their own physical and mental limits.   
This research has shown that by switching schedules (daily or weekly) can increase 
average daily driving hours but also alters the driver’s schedule quite significantly.  There are 
three main ways that drivers can switch their schedules: 1) increase the number of driving 
periods within a 24 hour period, 2) change the end time prior to the beginning of the 1 am to 
5 am provision, and 3) change the preference start time after the 1 am to 5 am provision 
requirements are met.  Utilizing these methods correctly may result in a daily driving average 
increase of 29 percent (see Figure 15).  However, these alterations in schedules can have 
various negative influences on drivers’ abilities.  Research has found that changes in driving 
patterns have been shown to create more fatigue and increase the accident rate (Salomon & 
Mokhtarian 1997; Mackie & Miller 1978).  A recent study by the American Transportation 
Research Institute showed that of the surveyed drivers, 66.3 percent indicated more fatigue of 
which 27.8 percent indicated much more fatigue due to the HOS change in July of 2013 
(Short, 2013).   Short found that 20.1 percent of truck drivers adjusted their start times, 15.6 
percent adjusted their end times, and 18.9 percent adjusted their overall schedule.  With 
changes in schedules and circadian rhythm, there is a greater chance of fatigue and possible 
accident (Harris 1977).  Our results show why schedules are changed.  
Long Term Plan 
This research revealed two aspects regarding HOS regulations: 1) HOS regulatory 
policy is uncertain (see Figure 7), and 2) HOS regulations vary highly with respect to average 
daily driving hours that can be achieved based on the different restrictions and provisions 
(see Table 4 History of HOS).  When there are frequent and large regulatory changes there is 
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an increase in investment risk that decreases the probability of company investment (Luo 
2004; Holcomb et al. 2014; Short 2013).  A decrease in investment occurs when the long-
term plan is uncertain, which diminishes investments in higher quality tractors and better-
trained truck drivers; thus, investments in safety will ultimately be postponed (Marcus & 
Kaufman 1986).  Moreover, attempting to invest in driver training, in such a high-turnover 
industry, is risky and economically challenging (Staplin & Gish 2005).  Not only are safety 
investments postponed, but research has also found that in an uncertain regulatory 
environment capital is diverted to lobbying efforts (Rothaermel & Hill 2005).   
The number of truck drivers and trucks, as well as the number and location of 
distribution centers, rest-stops, and loading docks, are but a few of the elements to consider 
when creating a long-term plan.  These elements often need time to adapt and stabilize after 
regulatory changes are made.  The frequent HOS regulatory changes, combined with the 
magnitude of change with respect to average daily driving hours disrupts the long-term plan 
and destabilizes balance in the trucking industry.  For instance, the 1 restart per 168 hours 
HOS regulation has reduced the total time that a truck driver can operate from 82 hours to 
less than 70-hours per week, a 14.6 percent decrease in truck driver duty hours (FMSCA 
2015).  Second, shipping routes and distribution centers are often set based on set miles that 
truck drivers were capable of driving when that route or distribution center was created.  
Changing the capacity of the truck driver influences many logistical functions such as just in 
time (JIT) (Tommelein & Li 1999), economic order quantity (EOQ) modelling (Hahm & 
Yano 1995; Liao & Chih-Hsiung 1991; Burns & Hall 1985); supply chain management 
(SCM) vulnerability and risks (Stecke & Kumar 2009) and many more.   
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Conclusions 
Overall, this research presented and applied perishable inventory theory and its 
associated tactics to the truck driving industry.  The applied tactics in this research were 
capacity, flexibility, substitution and or elimination, FIFO or LFIO, heterogeneity, and 
planning.  This research found great capacity differences in the various HOS regulations 
based on the exhaustive enumeration method, which may result in less safety due to future 
investments and planning in the truck driving industry.  This research also found that 
restrictions limit the flexibility of truck drivers, which has unintended consequences such as 
increased congestion, or avoiding resting when tired; both of which have major safety 
implications.  Additionally, this research showed how capacity can be increased through 
daily and weekly schedule changes, which, based upon the heterogeneity capability of the 
truck driver, may have negative safety implications.  Further complicating these tactics of 
perishability are the frequent HOS changes, which further destabilizes the industry.  
Analyzing HOS through the exhaustive enumeration technique and viewing the HOS 
regulatory constantly changing regulations through the lens of perishable inventory theory, 
HOS regulations have some major negative safety implications to truck drivers currently and 
to the truck driving industry in the future.  Future unintended consequences can be avoided 
by following this researches approach and method prior to implementation of future 
regulations.  
Limitations and Future Research 
As in all studies, there are limitations.  The limitations of this study provide potential 
future research opportunities.  This research provides a theoretical lens and optimization 
based on EE.  While this approach confirms or supports actual observations of truck drivers 
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made by other researchers, truck drivers are not a primary data source for this research.  
Truck drivers could and should be asked directly about these perishability concepts and 
tactics in future research.  Surveys analyzing truck companies and drivers, pre and post HOS 
changes, with respect to the concepts of perishable inventory theory could establish greater 
credibility for the theoretical foundation presented in this research.  Such research would 
provide greater insight into and evidence of the actual safety implications of the current 
regulatory environment. 
Additional research is needed in coalescing regulators and truck industry experts with 
respect to safety as part of the field of managerial controls (Miller & Saldanha 2013) and in 
order to ensure wiser regulatory policies (Breyer 1986).  Moreover, future research should 
look at directly measuring driver fatigue, through technologies such as the “sleepalyzer” 
(Williams et al. 2012, p.120), so that those direct measurements can be used to develop direct 
regulations, instead of indirect regulations that hope fatigued driving does not occur. 
Theoretical Contributions 
 This research has expanded the realm of the theory of research dealing with 
perishability by incorporating perishability more broadly into the service sector and 
specifically into the truck driving industry.  Moreover, by demonstrating that truck drivers’ 
time is perishable with respect to deterioration (fatigue) and obsolescence due to HOS 
regulations, this research has provided ample evidence as to the merit of this theory within 
the truck driving industry.   This research has brought together tactics from Perishable 
Inventory Theory, Perishable Asset Revenue Model, Deteriorating Theory, and Yield 
Management and applied them to truck driver’s perishable time.  Furthermore, the analysis 
found that the regulatory environment is not only currently in a state of change but also the 
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changes have dramatic impact on the tactic of capacity for truck drivers.  The combination of 
these two regulatory challenges may result in safety implications that are explained through 
the other tactics of perishability – flexibility, and planning.  Truck companies, through other 
different tactics of perishability (FIFO and LIFO, substitution and or elimination) may can 
increase capacity through proper planning of truck driver’s perishable time.  The tactic of 
heterogeneity was used to demonstrate that although truck drivers become obsolete at the 
same regulated time restrictions (due to HOS regulations), they deteriorate with respect to 
their driving skills very differently (due to personal fatigue related factors).  From these 
tactics for dealing with truck driver’s perishable time, greater clarity is presented to 
understanding this very complex problem of how to regulate truck driving in order to 
improve motorist’s safety.   
Managerial Contributions 
This research has shown that the truck driving industry is in turbulent times due to the 
frequency of regulatory changes and the magnitude of each change.  By understanding and 
following the many tactics of perishability, the manager will be able to optimize the average 
daily driving hours, service levels, and truck driver safety, whatever regulation happens to be 
in place.  
Capacity in the truck industry should be at the forefront of any manger or owner-
operator.  Although optimizing the miles driven may result in the most revenue, it does not 
necessarily translate into the most profit.  Rather, managers and owner-operators should 
consider developing a long-term plan that not only considers equipment and personnel but 
also the current regulatory environment and its subsequent impact on their business.  Since 
the regulatory environment is uncertain, managers should consider reducing their risk by 
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outsourcing (i.e., hiring temporary drivers, leasing equipment, and outsourcing maintenance) 
rather than making investments directly in these assets that may not amortize.  If the 
regulatory environment were to become more stable, less risk would be imposed on 
managers and owner-operators enabling them to have greater confidence in direct 
investments (insourcing) in personnel and equipment.   
Managers and owner-operators should also consider that investments can be made in 
other areas besides truck drivers and trucks.  Investments can be made into assets or 
processes that eliminate non-driving time for truck drivers thereby making them more 
efficient.  Substitution investments can be made into technologies that better enable truck 
drivers to accomplish their tasks in a more efficient and productive manner as well as 
reducing stress and fatigue.  These substitution investments decrease the variability of the 
workforce, which in turn enables the tactic of flexibility to flourish.  Proportioning the right 
amount of flexibility into the system to account for congestion, weather, maintenance and 
other factors is improved when processes are streamlined.  Unfortunately, some regulations 
greatly limit the flexibility of truck drivers’ time.  Companies employing truck drivers, 
owner-operators, and dispatchers should seek to understand the impact of these regulations 
and their negative consequences in order to ensure safe sustainable practices.  They should 
also realize the capabilities of each driver because they are not all the same and safety is 
highly dependent upon their heterogeneous abilities under challenging situations.  While 
some truck drivers may be able to drive maximum hours and switch weekly schedules (and 
circadian rhythms) on a regular basis without experiencing perishability with respect to their 
driving skills, other drivers may become perishable after their first 7 hours.  Once identified, 
these heterogeneous abilities in drivers can be used advantageously by matching drivers to 
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certain jobs (using either FIFO or LIFO), thereby maximizing the workforce while 
minimizing safety incidents.  Truck drivers who have higher abilities may be better used 
under the FIFO model ensuring non-obsolescence of their perishable time, based on HOS 
regulations, while drivers with lesser abilities can be used under the LIFO model ensuring 
their perishability does not result from fatigue.   
Legislative Contributions 
Policy makers can use the exhaustive enumeration (EE) approach and the theory of 
perishable resources, as this research has done, to better understand how new regulations will 
affect the industry.  The EE approach is low-cost and involves relatively simple calculations 
for a single regulation when comparing to existing or previous regulations in order to see the 
impact on the truck industry prior to its implementation.  Furthermore, this technique will 
provide the different capacities, which will illustrate the different consequences and 
incentives that may result from the implementation of the regulation; thus, avoiding the 
“unintended consequences” that sometimes follows regulation reform.  Finally, policy 
makers should also consider utilizing the tactics presented in this research to fully understand 
the many possible ramifications to safety while regulating truck drivers’ perishable time.   
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IV. An Exploratory Study of Hours of Service and its Safety Impact on Motorists  
Abstract 
In July 2013, the Federal Motor Safety Carrier Association (FMSCA) revised its 
Hours of Service (HOS) regulatory policy, which restricts the number of duty and driving 
hours a truck driver can operate.  The revision changed the unlimited restart provision by 
restricting it to 1 restart per 168 hours (1 week) and added that the restart must span two 
consecutive 1 am to 5 am periods.  Lawmakers suspended these two aspects of the restart 
provision in the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations act on December 16, 
2014 until more analysis was completed on the efficacy of these regulations due to 
unintended consequences that allegedly negatively affected motorist’s safety.  Countering 
truck driver fatigue is an important issue and an extremely difficult task because of the many 
confounding aspects that can cause fatigue.  The new regulation set forth in July 2013, was 
supposed to lessen fatigue and thus reduce accidents caused by truck drivers.  The current 
HOS regulation was in place for approximately 16 months, producing enough data for a 
statistical analysis of its effects on truck driver safety.  This research found that by comparing 
truck driving safety data prior to the change in July of 2013 (the unlimited restart provision) 
to truck driving safety data during the enactment of the 1 restart per 168-hour restriction and 
1 am to 5 am provision, that the percent of accidents caused by truck drivers did not 
decrease.  Furthermore, this research found that the HOS changes implemented on July 1, 
2013 have not led to a change in the continuing downward trend in accidents involved and 
caused by truck drivers.  These results suggest that other factors appear to be linked to 
motorists’ safety, rather than the updated HOS regulation. 
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Introduction 
Trucks are used to haul goods more than any other mode of transportation.  In fact, 
73.1 percent of value and 71.3 percent of volume of US domestic goods are shipped by 
trucks (US Census Bureau 2015).  Trucks transport a large portion of US shipped goods, and 
truck drivers are responsible for a large number of crashes and fatalities.  Pritchard (2010) 
found that there are about 5,000 fatal crashes involving trucks per year resulting in social 
costs greater than 32 billion dollars.  Many of these accidents have been caused by fatigued 
truck drivers, which could have been prevented with proper rest and truck driver awareness 
(Quan et al. 2015).  The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMSCA) has 
instituted measures that restrict the driving and duty hours of truck drivers to promote safety 
and minimize any negative economic impact on the commercial motor vehicle industry.  
FMSCA controls the duty and driving time limits of truck drivers through Hours of 
Service (HOS) regulations.  HOS regulations restrict the number of hours a truck driver can 
operate in order to reduce fatigue related accidents.  These regulations have changed over the 
years due to regulatory agencies attempting to balance fatigue related accidents and 
economic impact (see Table 8).  In 2003, FMSCA introduced a restart provision to the HOS 
regulations, which allowed truck drivers to reset their duty time log back to zero as long as 
they took 34 consecutive hours off duty.  In 2013, FMSCA altered the restart provision, 
which changed the amount of restarts from unlimited to 1 restart per 168-hours and included 
that the 34 cumulative hours off must also occur over two consecutive 1 am to 5 am periods. 
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There have been conflicting claims about the effectiveness of these recent HOS 
regulation changes.  Some trucking unions and some members of Congress have claimed 
negative safety implications due to prolonged traffic congestion during daytime hours and 
increased fatigue (Ferro 2014; Short 2013).  Conversely, legislative branch members and 
research has claimed that the HOS revision has decreased accidents, reduced damage, and 
most importantly, saved lives (Ferro 2014; Chen et al. 2015; FMSCA 2010).  
Year Changed 1938 1939 1962 2003 2005 2013 2014
Driving Hours 12 10 10 11 11 11 11
On-Duty Hours 15 N/A
N/A
14 14 14 14
Max Daily 
Work
12 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Off-Duty 
Hours
9 8 8 10 10 10 10
Duty Cycle 24 24 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
60 Hour (7-day) 60 60 60 60 60 60 60
70 Hour (8-day) 70 70 70 70 70 70 70
Break ≥8 ≥8
Restart ≥34 ≥34 ≥34 ≥34 
Number of 
Restarts
1 Per 168 
Hrs
N/A
1 am to 5 am ≥2 N/A
Sleeper Berths 
Split Sleep
≥2 hrs ≥8 hrs ≥8 hrs ≥8 hrs
Changes 7 4 1 5 1 3 2
Table 8 History of Hours of Service Changes 
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Although it is clear that driver fatigue is dangerous and has been linked to higher 
accident rates (Dinges 1995; Mackie & Miller 1978; Williamson & Friswell 2013; Summala 
& Mikkola 1994; Zhu & Srinivasan 2011), the effectiveness of HOS regulatory policy on 
reducing fatigue and making roads safer is still unclear (Arnold et al. 1997; Min 2009b).  
Research has found that many drivers actually begin their driving periods fatigued, indicating 
that HOS may restrict the number of operating hours but does not directly reduce fatigue or 
ensure alert truck drivers (Abrams et al. 1997). 
More specifically, these two restart changes (1 restart per 168 hours restriction and 
the 1 am to 5 am provision) that have been suspended, until more research is conducted, are 
believed by some to increase accident rates due to shifting truck drivers operational times to 
more congested periods (Short & Murray 2014; Ferro 2014; Federal Motor Carrier Safety 
Administration 2011).  Congress was set to reevaluate these two suspended restart changes, 
on September 30th of 2015 or after FMSCA finishes their studies revealing the HOS 1 per 
168-hour restart and 1 am to 5 am provision efficacy. 
This research investigates the safety efficacy of the 1 restart per 168-hour restriction 
and 1 am to 5 am provision that was enacted in July of 2013 through parametric and non-
parametric statistical analysis on accidents involving trucks within the state of Ohio.  This 
research analyzes Ohio’s accident data involving truck drivers and extrapolates these 
findings to the US as a whole.  This research compares the accidents involving trucks over 
two-time periods: 1) July 2009 to July 2013 – a period prior to the increase in restart 
restrictions and 2) July 2013 to July 2014 – a period in which the 1 restart per 168-hour 
restriction and 1 am to 5 am provision were in place.  Since these are the main aspects of 
 
100 
 
HOS regulations that changed between these two-time periods, this research aims to discover 
how the restart changes affected truck drivers and their accident rate in Ohio. 
The regulatory policy levied on the trucking industry has significant managerial, 
governance, and societal implications that may change driving safety for motorists.  This 
research first details the history of HOS and briefly discusses the most recent changes to 
HOS.  Then the methodology section provides the details of the analysis that was performed 
using the Ohio data followed by a discussion of the relevant findings.  Finally, some 
concluding remarks and suggestions for future research are presented.  
Literature Review 
Hours of Service (HOS) Background 
Federal Motor Safety Carrier Association (FMSCA) establishes HOS regulations for 
truck drivers.  These regulations stipulate the maximum duty and driving hours of truck 
drivers.  Moreover, HOS rules limit both daily and weekly duty and driving hours of truck 
drivers. Government agencies have stated that regulation in the trucking industry is important 
because of the increased potential of an accident that occurs as truck drivers work long hours 
(FMSCA 2015).  Previous research has also filled gaps regarding the source of truck driver 
accidents.  Most of this research has measured the effects of singular restrictions and 
accidents involving trucks with respect to fatigue, some examples of effects include: multi-
day driving patterns (Kaneko & Jovanis 1992), starting fatigue level (M. R. Crum & Morrow 
2002), driving hours per day (Hanowski et al. 2009; Soccolich et al. 2013; Williamson et al. 
2011), driving time of day (Blower & Campbell 1998), breaks (Chen & Xie 2014a), sleeper-
berths (Hertz 1988), truck miles (Lyman & Braver 2003; Joshua & Garber 1990; Jovanis & 
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Chang 1986), truck driver health (Anderson et al. 2012; Stoohs et al. 1994), and regulation 
enforcement improvements due to Electronic On-Board Recorders (Cantor et al. 2009). 
These research efforts and others have been influential in changes that have been 
made to HOS regulations.  The following section provides a historical perspective of some of 
these HOS changes. 
History of Hours of Service 
In an effort to mitigate fatigue-related accidents involving long-haul truck drivers, the 
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) established HOS regulation in 1938 (“Federal 
Register, Volume 65 Issue 85”, 2000).  By 1939, regulations restricted truck driving to ten-
hour increments and mandated rest periods of eight hours between those increments 
(“Federal Register, Volume 65 Issue 85”, 2000).  The policy was controversial for some 
drivers and government officials.  A FMSCA (2000) report quotes an ICC official who 
objected to the proposed HOS regulation in 1937: 
We have no control over the manner in which a driver may spend his time off-duty, 
although some of his spare time activities may tire him as much as any work would 
do.  We can only emphasize, by this comment, the responsibility which is the driver's 
own to assure himself of adequate rest and sleep, in the time available for this 
purpose, to ensure safety of his driving, and likewise the employer's responsibility to 
see that his drivers report for work in fit condition (ICC, 1937). 
 
The HOS policy remained predominantly unchanged for the next 60 years (Hall & 
Mukherjee 2008).  Subsequent revisions to the policy, which were implemented in January of 
2004, made three main changes with respect to time: 1) driving time increased to 11 hour 
increments, 2) duty hour restriction changed to a maximum of 14 hours on-duty and 10 hours 
off-duty before coming on-duty again, and 3) was provided a 34-hour restart period (Federal 
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Motor Carrier Safety Administration 2016).  These revisions occurred because there was 
“general recognition that the existing rules for the truck industries had been well 
implemented before there had been a clear scientific understanding of fatigue causal factors 
(e.g., time of day, amount and timing of sleep, time awake, and time on task)” (Federal 
Motor Carrier Safety Administration 2003, p.22458).  FMSCA brought in experts and relied 
heavily on fatigue research in order to update these HOS regulations. 
History of the Restart Provision 
The 34-hour unlimited restart provision for all commercial motor vehicles was 
instituted in 2003 in order to reduce the effect of cumulative fatigue and prevent fatigue-
related crashes.  However, FMSCA later found that the 34-hour unlimited restart provision 
provided the ability for truck drivers to attain more hours than 70 hours per week, which was 
previously not possible because of the 70-hour restriction.  The restart enabled truck drivers 
to operate 5 days, on a maximum schedule, and take a restart on the 6
th
 day and drive again 
on the 7
th
 day, enabling truck drivers to attain approximately 82 hours per 7-day period 
(Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration 2011).  This prompted FMSCA to limit the 
restart provision. 
 Further restart limitations were implemented on July of 2013.  The goal of the 
changed regulations was to lessen long work hours and decrease fatigue-related crashes and 
long-term health problems for truck drivers (Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration 
2003; Rodriguez et al. 2006; Dingus et al. 2006).  The additional restart restrictions included 
two main changes: 1) required that the restart restriction time covers from 1 a.m. to 5 a.m. for 
two consecutive nights, and 2) limited drivers to 1 restart per 168-hour interval. 
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The additional restart restrictions were predicted to further reduce the continuing 
downward trend in safety-related accidents by preventing an additional 1,400 crashes, 560 
injuries, and 19 deaths per annum (Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration 2016).  
These two restart provisions were suspended due to growing concerns of unintended 
consequences in December of 2014 until September 2015, or until further research was 
accomplished providing data on the efficacy of these provisions.  The 34-hour unlimited 
restart provision was reconstituted in December of 2014. 
1 Restart per 168-hours and 1 a.m. to 5 a.m. Provision 
One of the major aspects of the HOS regulations is the number of restarts a driver can 
utilize.  In July 2013, the restart changed from unlimited to only one restart per 168-hour 
period.  The ability to take more than one restart per 168-hour period provided drivers with 
the opportunity to be on duty more hours than the 60 hours per 7 days provision or 70 hours 
per 8 days provision.  Using unlimited restarts, under the 60-hour provision, a truck driver 
could obtain 78.4 duty hours per week.  Under the 70-hour provision, using unlimited 
restarts, a truck driver could obtain 81.66 duty hours per week.  The updated HOS regulation, 
which limits a driver to one restart per 168-hour period, decreases the total number of duty 
hours to 70 for the 70-hour provision and to 60 for the 60-hour provision.  This is 
approximately a 16.6 percent reduction for the 70-hour provision, and a 30 percent reduction 
for the 60-hour provision. 
While more total duty hours within a given driving period has been shown to lead to 
more accidents (Cantor et al. 2010; Harris 1977; Soccolich et al. 2013; Wiegand et al. 2009), 
no studies have been done on the safety implications of multiple restart periods and its effect 
on truck driver fatigue.  Since drivers should be the most rested immediately following a 
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restart period, it could be assumed that more restarts during a given period may actually 
increase driver safety.  However, FMSCA limited the restarts to 1 per 168 hours because of 
excessive buildup of on-duty hours that can occur before and after a restart is taken, without 
sufficient evidence regarding fatigue and use of multiple restarts (Federal Motor Carrier 
Safety Administration 2011; Ferro 2014). 
In conjunction with the 1 restart per 168 hour restriction, FMSCA instituted the 1 
a.m. to 5 a.m. provision.  Previous iterations of the HOS regulation have restricted the 
amount of driving and duty time for a truck driver, but regulations have never stipulated the 
exact time of day during which the restart time must occur (Federal Motor Carrier Safety 
Administration, 2016).   
The 1 a.m. to 5 a.m. provision was adopted by FMSCA due to research indicating that 
the most effective sleep occurs at 2 a.m. to 5 a.m., thus ensuring time off during the major 
circadian low for the majority of truck drivers (Folkard & Tucker 2003; Dongen & Dinges 
2005).  Research has also found that sleep at night for daytime workers is better than sleep 
during the day for nighttime workers (Lavie 1986; Van Dongen & Mollicone 2014; McCartt 
et al. 2000). 
By implementing the 1 am to 5 am provision, truck drivers who drive at night may 
also switch schedules and begin driving during the day to correspond with the time of the 
provision.  This may improve safety, because research has found that when removing traffic 
density or congestion, driving at night is 10 times as dangerous than during the day for truck 
drivers (Lavie 1986; Horne & Reyner 1995).  Although night-time driving is dangerous due 
to potential for increased fatigue and darkness, day-time driving is dangerous due to 
increased congestion. 
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Shifting more drivers to the day leads to increased congestion, which has been shown 
to impact motorist’s safety.  First, increased congestion reduces miles driven, thereby making 
drivers operate more daily hours (Kok et al. 2012) and exposing the driver’s to the higher 
risks associated with longer days.  Second, research has shown that traffic flow was the 
single most important factor (more than circadian rhythm) in determining accident rates 
(Dingus et al. 2006).  Higher disparity of speed differences between vehicle types is a major 
reason for increased accident rates, due to the acceleration and deceleration differences 
between large and small vehicles in congestion (Chen et al. 2011; Beilock 1995; McCorry & 
Murray 1993; Peeta et al. 2005; Neeley & Richardson 2009).  Basically, as congestion 
increases, the rate of accidents also increases (Kononov et al. 2008).  Campbell (1995) 
suggested providing greater incentives for truck drivers to operate outside the congested 
periods due to increased safety for trucks and motorists.  However, FMSCA’s 1 am to 5 am 
provision resulted in an incentive to the drive during congested periods (Commerce 
Appropriations Act, 2014).  
One of the other possible consequences of the 1 am to 5 am was that nighttime drivers 
may shift their schedule to minimize the restart period duration and increase operating hours 
(Short & Murray 2014; Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration 2011).  FMSCA also 
stated that nighttime drivers will generally migrate to daytime schedules due to family life 
and events occurring at home since they do not want to sleep when everyone else is awake 
(Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, 2011).  Shifting schedules has been found to 
be a major cause of truck driver fatigue (Åkerstedt et al. 2008; Williamson et al. 2011; Rio-
Bermudez et al. 2014; Dongen & Dinges 2005). 
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The 1 a.m. to 5 a.m. stipulation also becomes challenging because of the different and 
numerous time zones in which truck drivers operate.  The restart period time is based on the 
truck driver’s home terminal time and not their current location (FMSCA, 2016).  For 
example, a truck driver from Indiana driving to Nevada is mandated to rest during the restart 
period from the Nevada local time of 10 p.m. to 2 a.m.  Conversely, a truck driver from 
Nevada driving to Indiana is mandated to rest during the restart period from the Indiana local 
time of 4 a.m. to 8 a.m., which may no longer span the most effective sleep time (2 am to 5 
am).  The 1 a.m. to 5 a.m. stipulation becomes even more arbitrary for truck drivers who are 
away from their home terminal time for long periods.  Also, tracking home terminal times 
and local times, especially when crossing multiple time zones, becomes onerous for the truck 
driver and becomes the source of potential, accidental record keeping violations.   
The safety impact of the 1 restart per 168 hours and the 1 a.m. to 5 a.m. provision to 
truck drivers is difficult to discern because of the multiple effects that are occurring that were 
previously discussed: a likely increase in truck traffic during congested period, changes in 
truck driver circadian rhythm, a possible decrease in driving hours and night-time driving, 
and an unknown safety implications of the 1 am to 5 am home terminal time.  Unfortunately, 
FMSCA adopted the 1 restart per 168 hour restriction and the 1 a.m. to 5 a.m. provision prior 
to completing necessary research, which would have greatly aided in understanding the 
possible safety implications of changing HOS regulations.  Representative Richard Hanna 
(Vice Chair for Highways and Transit) stated “The intent is clearly that the study be 
completed before the rule is enacted,” at which time the study was anticipated to be 
completed approximately one year after the change was ratified (Ferro, 2014).   
 
107 
 
Mandated 30-Minute Break Provision 
The 30-minute rest break is an additional HOS regulation that was adopted in July of 
2013.  The 30-minute break was not suspended in December of 2014, and continues to 
remain in effect.  Although the schedule placement of the 30-minute break has some 
flexibility, it must occur within the first 8 hours of driving.  In order to count as a 30-minute 
break, the truck driver must not be working in any capacity, but can use that time for such 
things as eating, resting, or exercising (FMSCA, 2016).   
Blanco et al. (2011) researched rest breaks, as part of a FMSCA-sponsored study, 
providing the legislative branch the conclusions needed to enact the 30-minute break 
provision.  They noted that of the 97 drivers monitored, their duty day was comprised of 66 
percent driving, 23 percent non-driving work, and 11 percent resting.  They also found that 
the rate of accidents decreased immediately following the break.  However, they also 
observed that the rate of accidents were highest at the end of the driving period.  Some 
research suggests that the addition of the break, which causes the overall duty day to be 
lengthened, may lead to more net accidents (Short 2013; Chen & Xie 2014b).  This suggests 
that some of the benefits of the break are offset by an increase in accidents due to the 
extension of the driving period.   
Another finding that challenges the 30-minute break provision is the ability to enforce 
this regulation (Short, 2013).  This rule ensures that the truck is not continually driven, due to 
the electronic logbook, but it cannot guarantee that the driver is not performing duty-related 
activities.  Blanco et al. (2011) found that off-duty breaks were best, but any break that was 
different from driving also provided an accident rate reduction.  
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Unintended Consequences of Regulatory Policy 
Balancing many unique work and lifestyle demands makes a “one-size-fits-all” 
approach to regulation difficult.  When policies are made in order to curtail a dangerous 
event or certain behavior, other unintended problems may arise.  Senator Collins stated, “it 
has become clear that the rules have had unintended consequences that are not in the best 
interest of carriers, shippers and the public” (Patton 2014). 
Sometimes regulations intending to reduce fatigue may actually increase it for some 
truck drivers.  A 2008 report to FMSCA found no evidence suggesting a 2003 rule change 
decreased the number of deaths caused by large truck crashes and stated that it may have 
actually increased the number of deaths (FMSCA, 2015; Short, 2013; Min, 2009; ATA, 
2013; Holcomb, 2014).  Simply put, HOS regulation does not ensure well-rested drivers; it 
ensures specified off-duty times and driving/duty time limits. 
There are three unintended consequences of HOS: 1) a switching from nighttime 
driving to daytime driving, 2) an increase in the stress levels of drivers, and 3) a need for 
more truck drivers (Ferro 2014; Short & Murray 2014; Brewster & Short 2014; Goel 2014).  
Concerning switching schedules, FMSCA (2016) claimed to know of no reason why truck 
drivers would change from driving at night to driving during the day.  This claim contradicts 
recent studies, which found approximately 15 percent of drivers have indeed changed their 
schedules by switching from nighttime to daytime driving in order to work within the 
regulations (Fender & Pierce 2013).  Changing work and sleep times have been shown to 
increase fatigue and the rate at which accidents occur (Rio-Bermudez et al. 2014; Åkerstedt 
1998; Torregroza-Vargas et al. 2014; Goel 2014). 
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 In addition to increasing fatigue, changing work and sleep times can increase 
physical, emotional, and mental stress levels for drivers (Sando et al. 2010; Chen et al. 2015).  
Truck drivers may also become fatigued from financial stress related to restrictive rules that 
are enforced by large ($2,750 per incident) fines, or pay decreases due to driving time 
limitations (Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration 2016; Short 2013; Min 2009a; 
Holcomb et al. 2014).  
The third unintended consequence of HOS is the need for more truck drivers.  More 
restrictive HOS changes cause the loss of available man-hours, leading to an increased need 
for companies to hire more drivers and cancel or decline shipments (Min 2009b).  Newly 
hired drivers will not have the same experience or training as existing drivers.  This may 
increase the rate at which truck drivers cause accidents (Belzer et al. 2014).  HOS regulations 
create persistent driver training and retention challenges (Belzer et al. 2014).  High turnover 
reduces driver qualifications and route familiarity, which in turn can decrease safety.   
Accident Background 
Accidents per mile involving and caused by truck drivers have steadily decreased 
over time (Lyman & Braver 2003; Bruning 1989; Robert D Pritchard 2010).  In their final 
rule, FMSCA (2011) reported crash rates falling well before 2004 and a general downward 
trend in Commercial Motor Vehicle (CMV) deaths that rose between 2003 and 2006 and then 
dropped in the following years.  FMSCA also reported there was another subsequent drop in 
driver deaths in 2008, but stated that it could be due to other factors such as a weaker 
economy that led to reduced driving, increased seat-belt use, and better training and retaining 
of truck drivers.  In 1975, truck crashes occurred at a rate of 5.8 per billion miles traveled 
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(Martinez 1997) and is now at 1.27 per billion miles traveled (National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration 2016).   
Although the overall number of accidents are declining per mile, there is research 
indicating the severity of accidents has increased due to size and speed of the trucks (Zhu & 
Srinivasan 2011; Duncan et al. 1998).  But severity of an accident has not necessarily led to a 
higher percentage of fatalities, which is in part due to safety technologies that benefit all 
motorists (Kahane 2015).  Safety technologies such as airbags (front and side), lane assist, 
LIDR, GPS, better maintenance of vehicles, and enhanced brakes are claimed to have saved 
over 328,551 lives from 1960 to 2002 (Kahane 2015).  In 2014, the NHTSA found that 1,144 
lives were saved among passenger vehicles in 2012 due to lane assist technologies.  Drivers 
may also be receiving better training and awareness on factors leading to accidents such as 
fatigue, medication, weather conditions, traffic congestion, enabling higher quality risk-
management decisions and thus a lower number of accidents caused by truck drivers.   
There have been numerous studies approximating the percent of fatigue related truck 
accidents: 20 percent (Moonesinghe et al. 2003); 41 percent (The American Automobile 
Association Foundation for Traffic Safety 1985); 31 percent (NTSB 1990); 16 to 55 percent 
(Chang & Chien 2013).  In our research, the percent provided by a FMSCA sponsored study 
is used, which showed that fatigue is the main cause of truck-related accidents 13 percent of 
time (Craft and Blower, 2007). 
Other Changes in Ohio Law  
Other factors that may also have an impact on truck accidents during the periods 
studied are other changes to laws and regulations for vehicles in Ohio.  There are two 
regulations that are thus discussed: speed limit changes and distracted driving laws 
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implemented during the period studied (2009-2014).  In the state of Ohio, House Bill 395 
passed increasing speed limits for 607 miles of highways and freeways across Ohio, and also 
aligned truck speeds to the same speed as other motor vehicles (Grant 2013).  Studies have 
found increased crash rates and severity due to increased speeds; studies have also found 
large differences in speeds between vehicles correlate to higher crash rates (Aarts & Van 
Schagen 2006; Solomon 1964).  However, Ohio increased speeds only on major roads.  The 
speed limit increase in 2011 on the Ohio turnpike saw a decrease in the mean number of 
fatalities (Armon 2013).  The Crash Risk Curve, developed by Solomon (1964), illustrated 
that driving at the median speed had the lowest probability of a crash.  Since truck drivers 
had lower speed limits than that of motorists, the speed variation on roads was greater and 
more unsafe.  Since the bill both increased the speed limit for motorists on major roads 
(leading to an increase in crash rates) and uniformly aligned speeds for trucks and 
automobiles (resulting in a reduction in crash rates), it is reasonable to assume that the speed 
limit changes should not have significantly changed crash rates involving trucks over the 
periods being studied by this research.   
The second law that changed dealt with distracted driving, which has been a major 
concern as a causal factor in crash accidents (Dingus et al. 2006; Young et al. 2007).  Ohio 
passed a texting law in June 2012, which was primary for drivers under 18 and secondary 
(meaning that officers cannot cite based only on the texting) for drivers over 18.  Since truck 
drivers must be over 21 to drive, and research has found that secondary texting laws do not 
have an effect on accident rate (Abouk & Adams 2013) this law was not considered in this 
research. 
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The next section will discuss the approach used to discern the safety efficacy of the 1 
restart per 168 hour restriction and the 1 am to 5 am provision aspects of the recent HOS 
revisions on the safety of truck drivers in Ohio.   
Method 
Monthly data from all 88 counties in Ohio were analyzed, providing insight into the 
recent changes made to HOS regulation and the associated safety implications on motorist 
and truck driver safety.  Monthly data was used because the changes to HOS occurred in 
July, instead of at the start of the calendar year, January.  The state of Ohio is used because of 
its timely compilation of motor vehicle statistics available for research and because of Ohio’s 
similar population density, roadways, and truck routes that cause Ohio (12.05 crashes per 
million people) and the US (11.22 crashes per million people) to also have a similar fatality 
rate with respect to large truck crashes (see Figure 18).   
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Although Ohio’s roadways or geography may be unique in the US, it does not present 
a problem in extrapolating Ohio’s data because historical data captures any unique geography 
or roadway characteristics that may exist in Ohio.  Also by analyzing the time in question 
(July 2013-June 2014) for Ohio and extrapolating upon that geographic data removes the 
element of change that may occur due to time (Saccomanno & Nassar 1997; Khasnabis & 
Ramiz-Al-Assar 1989; Gordon 1994).  Regressions are created from historical accidents 
involving trucks that occurred in Ohio providing a consistent historical percentage, which is 
used to approximate the impact of HOS in the US.  Data used in Ohio provides information 
of HOS impact in the US similar to the extrapolating work conducted by Paddock (1974) and 
Vogt and Bared (1998) using road and intersection data from Minnesota and Washington to 
Figure 18 Truck Crash Rate and Population Density for 2012 
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build accident models; and Khattak, Schneider, and Targa (2003) who estimated risk factors 
in truck rollovers from police reports from North Carolina from 1996 to 1998.   
A total of 60 months of retrospective data are analyzed.  Since the HOS regulation 
was changed in July of 2013, calendar year data would not measure the correct treatments.  
The 12 month span from July 2013 to June of 2014 is named post-HOS data.  In order to 
avoid seasonality fluctuations in the data, the other 48 months were grouped into four years 
starting in July and ending in the June (named pre-HOS data).  This provides a total of five 
years of data that can be broken down by months, by year, and by pre- and post- HOS.  Four 
of these five years, or 48 of the 60 months, detail accidents involving trucks regulated under 
the unlimited restart provision and 12 months, detail accidents involving trucks regulated 
under the 1 restart per 168-hour restriction combined with the 1 am to 5 am provision.   
There are nine variables of interest for each month.  These variables are: 1) total 
fatalities involving trucks, 2) total fatalities caused by truck drivers, 3) percent of fatalities 
caused by truck drivers, 4) total injuries involving trucks, 5) total injuries caused by truck 
drivers, 6) percent of injuries caused by truck drivers, 7) total property damage accidents 
involving trucks, 8) total property damage accidents caused by truck drivers, and 9) percent 
of property damage accidents caused by trucks
2
.  This research examined 540 data points 
from this 5 year or 60 month period (60 months * 9 variables of interest = 540 data points).   
                                                 
 
 
 
2 Accidents caused by truck drivers were determined by the investigating officer at the scene. 
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 First, pairwise comparisons were made between the pre- and post-HOS monthly 
outcomes of the nine variables of interest.  More specifically, for the pre-HOS data, monthly 
data averages (4-months of data across four years for each calendar month), standard 
deviations, and variances were computed and compared to the same statistical measurements 
against the post-HOS monthly data using the paired t-test for injuries and property damage.  
For fatality data, parametric assumptions were not met to conduct the paired t-test, so the 
non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed Rank test was applied (Hollander et al. 2013).  
In order to account for any possible downward trend of accidents over the years, these 
comparisons were expanded to examine the differences in the variables of interest by year 
versus grouping them as pre- and post-HOS.  Each year was now considered a treatment in 
analysis of the variables of interest to capture differences utilizing parametric and non-
parametric testing techniques.  
To examine differences between years, Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) testing was 
conducted followed by the post-hoc Fisher’s Least Significant Difference (LSD) pairwise 
comparison when ANOVA parametric assumptions were met.  For the assumptions, 
normality was assessed using the Shapiro-Wilks test (Razali & Wah 2011).  Constant 
variance was assessed using the Bartlett test (Levene 1960); and independence was assessed 
via the Durbin-Watson test (Kanlayasiri & Boonmung 2007).  Consequently, ANOVA was 
appropriate for analyzing injuries and property damage involving trucks or caused by trucks.  
Since the fatality data failed the test for normality, the nonparametric Friedman, Kruskal-
Wallis, and subsequent post-hoc Wilcoxon Rank Sum tests were used for data relating to 
fatalities followed by the Wilcoxon Rank Sum test for pairwise comparisons.   
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Finally, utilizing data from the Department of Transportation (DoT) regarding the 
same types of accident involving trucks (fatalities, injury, and property damage) from 2002 
until 2012 enabled regressions to project US accident types involving trucks for the time 
period of July 2013 to June of 2014.  Three estimates emerged from each of the regressed 
points: 1) the predicted regressed estimate if no HOS changes occurred, 2) the corresponding 
projected FMSCA claim estimate, calculated as the estimate if no HOS changes occurred less 
the anticipated improvement by type of accident (19 fatalities, 560 injuries, and 1400 
property damage), and 3) an estimate for the possible reduction of fatigue related accidents 
computed as deducting 13 percent from the estimate if no HOS changes occurred.  These 
corresponding points were then analyzed against the Ohio extrapolated point, which is 
discussed next. 
Utilizing the data from Ohio Department of Safety Statistics, accident data was 
collected from 2002 through 2012 regarding the same types of accidents (fatal, injury, and 
property damage) and modeled as a function of time (year).  This regression provided the 
estimate of what should have occurred given no change in HOS regulation.  This value was 
divided by the actual number of accidents, by type of accident, providing a corresponding 
percentage that was used to extrapolate the US estimate for the period from July 2013 to June 
of 2014.  This approach is similar to research used by the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration (NHTSA) to gain awareness of vehicle weights or safety belt use and their 
relationship with fatalities (Kahane 1997).  
Confidence intervals on the regression lines describing the relationship of type of 
accident over years were used to examine whether or not the above regression estimates 
predicted by FMSCA and the Ohio point estimate are within the associated confidence 
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bounds.  The magnitude of the FMSCA estimates were compared to the total US accidents, 
and to the total US accidents that were perhaps caused by fatigue. 
Many studies compare the number of accidents to the vehicle miles traveled in order 
to substantiate a rate that accounts for the quantity of truck miles on the road (Forkenbrock 
1999; Jovanis & Chang 1986; Miller et al. 1991).  This could not be accomplished for this 
research because it utilized mid-year data (beginning in July and ending in June) where the 
VMT is reported on an annual basis.  Instead, traffic, toll road (a road that drivers must pay 
directly to use), and gas tax revenue data were examined in order to eliminate or reduce 
effects from other possible influencing or confounding factors (Downs 1992).  In addition, 
toll roads break down the vehicle class providing data on the actual vehicles on toll ways, 
just as gas tax revenue similarly estimates traffic congestion (Newman & Kenworthy 1989).  
All analyses assumed an alpha equal 0.05 level of significance and were conducted 
primarily using JMPv11.0 software.  Results concerning the analyses of the previously 
mentioned 9 variables of interest are presented in the next section. 
Analysis 
Pre-HOS vs. Post-HOS Analysis 
Summary statistics for fatalities are shown in Table 9.  Although there was a drop in 
fatal accidents from pre-HOS (mean 10.48 and median 10) to post-HOS (mean 9.17 and 
median 9.5), this decrease was not statistically significant (p-value=0.309).  Incongruously, 
fatality accidents caused by truck drivers rose slightly from pre-HOS (mean 3 and median 3) 
to post-HOS (mean 3.42 and median 3).  However, this increase was also not significant (p-
value=0.586). 
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Conversely, paired t-tests (see Table 10 and Table 11 where significant p-values are 
shaded) indicate there are significant differences between pre- and post-HOS periods 
regarding injury and property damage accidents involving trucks.  Total injury accidents 
decreased by a mean difference of 51.75 per month (p-value < 0.001).  Furthermore, the 
mean number of injuries caused by truck drivers decreased by greater than 22 accidents per 
month (p-value = 0.007).  Additionally, property damage accidents involving trucks  
decreased by approximately 240 per month, and by 132 property damage accidents caused by 
truck drivers (p-values < 0.001).  
 
 
Table 9 Comparison of Pre- and Post-HOS Fatal Accidents 
Causation Category Statistical Category
PRE HOS (48 Months) 
July 2009 - June 2013
POST HOS (12 Months) 
July 2013 - June 2014
(Pre vs Post HOS)                     
P-Value
Mean 10.48 9.17
Standard Deviation 3.57 4.61
Median 10 9.5
Mean 3 3.42
Standard Deviation 1.79 2.35
Median 3 3
Fatal Accidents 
Involving Trucks
Fatal Accidents Caused 
by Truck Driver
0.309
0.586
Table 10 Injury Accident Analysis 
Causation Category Statistical Category
PRE HOS (48 Months) 
July 2009 - June 2013
POST HOS (12 Months) 
July 2013 - June 2014
(Pre vs Post HOS)                         
P-Value
Mean 293.25 241.5
Standard Deviation 41.68 62.94
Median 298.5 241
Mean 152.48 129.83
Standard Deviation 24.39 28.37
Median 155 126.5
Injury Accidents 
Involving Trucks
Injury Accidents Caused 
by Truck Driver
<0.001
0.007
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12-Month Increments Analysis 
In order to account more accurately for the general decreasing trend in accidents with 
respect to time, the 48-month block pre-HOS was broken down into four periods.  Each 
period consists of 12 month (July to June) ranging from 2009 to 2013. 
Fatal accidents caused by truck drivers were not significantly different from any other 
year, based on a Friedman test (p-value = 0.208), nor were fatality accidents (p-value = 
0.425) as can be seen in Figure 19. 
 
Table 12 breaks down the fatality data further by providing overall rank and p-value 
differences based on the Wilcoxon Signed Rank tests.  Ranking similar months across the 
Figure 19 Fatalities Distribution Caused and Involved with Truck Drivers in Ohio 
Table 11 Property Damage Accident Analysis 
Causation Category Statistical Category
PRE HOS (48 Months) 
July 2009 - June 2013
POST HOS (12 Months) 
July 2013 - June 2014
(Pre vs Post HOS)                             
P-Value
Mean 1178.04 937.83
Standard Deviation 183.66 223.77
Median 1174 937
Mean 701.29 569
Standard Deviation 108.82 132.83
Median 707 533
Property Accidents 
Involving Trucks
<0.001
Property Accidents 
Caused by Truck Driver
<0.001
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five different periods, and then taking the average rank for that specific period, provides a 
means for a nonparametric comparison of the data.  The rank differences are the rank of the 
reference years subtracted by the contrasted years.  Although not statistically significant, 
Table 12 reveals that the post-HOS for fatalities involving trucks was on average 0.41 less 
than the previous period (p-value = 0.59), but was 0.88 higher in regards to truck drivers (p-
value = 0.25).  Fatalities caused by truck drivers, in the post-HOS period, were the second 
highest average rank period, but were the lowest in fatalities involving trucks. 
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Table 13 and Table 14 depict mean differences between each 12-month period 
regarding injuries, and property damage.  There were significant differences between means 
in the number of accidents of at least some of the 12-month periods (ANOVA p-value < 
0.001).  Shaded values indicate that the reference year is significantly different from the 
contrasted year.  The LSD pairwise results suggest a greater mean change between larger 
time spans confirming a downward slope of occurrences over time.  Consequently, it is more 
likely that the post-HOS period is most comparable to the preceding 12-month period.  As 
such, post-HOS data is not significantly different from the previous 12-month period in terms 
of injury, property damage, or total accidents.  As an illustration of this point, injuries caused 
by truck drivers during the period of July 2013- June 2014, and the previous 12 months 
indicates a mean difference of -3.08 at a non-significant p-value of 0.744.  When comparing 
the July 2013-June 2014 period with the period beginning in 2011 and ending in 2012, the 
Table 12 Fatalities Involved and Caused by Trucks Contrasted by Year 
Contrasted 
Year
Median 
Difference
Rank 
Difference
 P-Value
Median 
Difference
Rank 
Difference
 P-Value
2012-13 -1 -0.41 0.585 1.5 0.88 0.300
2011-12 -0.5 -1.16 0.127 -0.5 -0.54 0.413
2010-11 -1.5 -0.75 0.326 0.5 0.33 0.703
2009-10 0.5 -0.79 0.300 0 0.38 0.703
2011-12 0.5 -0.75 0.321 -2 -1.42 0.064
2010-11 -0.5 -0.34 0.663 -1 -0.55 0.513
2009-10 1.5 -0.38 0.623 -1.5 -0.5 0.513
2010-11 -1 0.41 0.585 1 0.87 0.230
2009-10 1 0.37 0.623 0.5 0.92 0.230
2009-10 2 -0.04 0.956 -0.5 0.05 0.999
Fatality Caused by Truck 
July 2010 - June 2011
Reference Year
Fatality Involving a Truck 
July 2013-June 2014 
July 2012 - June 2013
July 2011 - June 2012
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mean decreased by 25.42 with an associated significant p-value of <0.009.  The two main 
concepts from these tables are: 1) there has been a downward trend in accidents involving 
and caused by truck drivers and 2) the post-HOS year is not significantly different from the 
previous year in terms of injuries, and property damage caused or involved with truck 
drivers.  The analysis results suggest that HOS did not improve safety more than what had 
already been occurring. 
 
  
Table 13 Injuries Involving and Caused by Trucks Contrasted by Year 
Contrasted 
Year
Mean 
Difference
P-Value
Mean 
Difference
P-Value
2012-13 -10.92 0.518 -3.080 0.744
2011-12 -54.67 0.002 -25.420 0.009
2010-11 -82.92 <.001 -38.420 <.001
2009-10 -58.5 <.001 -23.670 0.021
2011-12 -43.75 0.012 -22.330 <.001
2010-11 -72 <.001 -35.330 0.033
2009-10 -47.58 0.006 -20.580 0.002
2010-11 -28.25 0.098 -13.000 0.172
2009-10 -3.83 0.820 1.750 0.853
Injury Accidents
Involving a Truck Caused by Truck
Reference Year
July 2013-June 2014 
(Post-HOS)
July 2012 - June 2013
July 2011 - June 2012
Tests 2 Groups July 2010 - June 2011 2009-10 24.42 0.151 14.750 0.122 55.420 0.448 43.500 0.320 80.330 0.364 58.000 0.255 2009-10 24.42 0.151 14.750 0.122July 2010 - June 2011
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Percent of Truck Drivers at Fault Analysis 
An analysis of percentages rather than actual values associated with truck-related 
accidents can yield additional insights.  Looking at the percentage of crashes caused by truck 
drivers out of the total number of crashes involving trucks provides a better comparison 
between years, which may involve differences attributable to features such as highway 
technologies, road construction, vehicle safety equipment, traffic congestion, weather, etc.  
Since HOS only targeted truck drivers, it would be intuitive that the percentage of truck 
drivers at fault would drop due to the added benefit of the safety regulation.  Table 15 
presents the percentage of truck drivers at fault for fatalities, injuries, and property damages 
involving trucks.  Across all of these categories, the percentage of accidents caused by truck 
drivers increased during this period.  This indicates that more truck drivers are responsible 
for accidents occurring; however, these trends were not statistically significant (p-value 
between 0.113 and 0.247). 
 
Table 14 Property Damage Involving and Caused by Trucks Contrasted by Year 
Contrasted 
Year
Mean 
Difference
P-Value
Mean 
Difference
P-Value
2012-13 -85.830 0.242 -46.250 0.290
2011-12 -288.420 <.001 -170.080 <.001
2010-11 -321.000 <.001 -178.170 <.001
2009-10 -265.580 <.001 -134.670 0.003
2011-12 -202.580 <.001 -123.830 0.006
2010-11 -235.170 <.001 -131.920 0.004
2009-10 -179.750 0.016 -88.420 0.046
2010-11 -32.580 0.655 -8.080 0.853
2009-10 22.830 0.754 35.420 0.417
July 2012 - June 2013
July 2011 - June 2012
Property Damage Accidents
Involving a Truck Caused by Truck
Reference Year
July 2013-June 2014 
Post-HOS
Tests 2 Groups July 2010 - June 2011 2009-10 24.42 0.151 14.750 0.122 55.420 0.448 43.500 0.320 80.330 0.364 58.000 0.255 2009-10 24.42 0.151 14.750 0.122 2009-10 55.420 0.448 43.500 0.320July 2010 - June 2011
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Percentage data were further stratified into the five 12-month periods beginning in 
July and ending in June (Table 16).  The percentage of truck drivers at fault increased during 
the post-HOS period.  The post-HOS period has a higher mean across all measures than all 
the prior years, however, this difference was only significant for fatalities caused by truck 
drivers when compared to the previous year 2012-13 (p-value=0.026).   
 
Ohio Extrapolation to the US Analysis 
Extrapolating the Ohio data to the US is important to gain insight on the impact of 
HOS across the US and to compare the results to FMSCA’s predictions of 19 lives saved, 
560 injuries prevented, and 1,400 property damage accidents avoided.  US data used from 
2002-2012 provided the regression data needed to estimate what the US should have seen 
during the period of July 2013 to June 2014 if the 1 restart per 168 hours and 1 am to 5 am 
Table 15 Post and Pre HOS Percent Distributions 
Accident Type Caused 
By Truck Driver
Pre-HOS Mean% (Standard 
Deviation)
Post-HOS Mean%  (Standard 
Deviation)
(Pre- vs Post-HOS Mean)                                     
P-Value
Fatal 28.28% (13.99% Std Dev) 36.72% (23.67% Std Dev) 0.114
Injury 52.04% (4.45% Std Dev) 54.46% (5.43% Std Dev) 0.113
Property Damage 58.63% (3.33% Std Dev) 60.92% (3.75% Std Dev) 0.247
Table 16 Ohio Percent of Accidents Caused by Truck Drivers Least Significant Difference 
% Fatality Caused by 
Truck 
% Injury Caused by 
Truck 
% Property Damage 
Caused by Truck 
% Total Caused by 
Truck 
Contrasted Year 
Pre-HOS
Mean 
Difference
P-Value
Mean 
Difference
P-Value
Mean 
Difference
P-Value
Mean 
Difference
P-Value
2012-13 13.61 0.026 1.87 0.295 0.92 0.476 1.19 0.304
2011-12 0.9 0.881 2.2 0.220 0.53 0.681 0.79 0.491
2010-11 11.77 0.054 2.46 0.171 1.33 0.305 1.61 0.166
Reference Year              
Post-HOS
July 2013-June 2014
2009-10 7.46 0.217 3.15 0.080 2.38 0.069 2.52 0.031
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was not implemented.  These three estimates (fatality, injury, and property damage accidents 
involving trucks) are labeled US regression estimate in Table 17 HOS Analysis The 
associated FMSCA predictions are subtracted from these predicted estimates providing an 
estimate of change that the revised HOS regulations should have achieved.  The next column, 
labeled Ohio extrapolated point on US fatalities, indicates the change extrapolated from Ohio 
based on multiple factors.  First, three (fatality, injury, property damage) regressions were 
performed on accidents involving trucks in Ohio from 2002 to 2012 providing a regression 
estimate for July 2013 to June 2014 period if HOS did not change.  Using the actual number 
of accidents that occurred in Ohio by type (fatality, injury, and property damage) during July 
2013 to June 2014, and dividing it by the regression estimate provided a percent.  This 
percent was then multiplied by the US regression estimate used earlier.  This value is a 
prediction, based on Ohio, of the impact that the 1 restart per 168 hour restriction and the 1 
am to 5 am provision had on truck-safety in the US.  The last column, labeled “US regression 
estimate reduced by 13 percent fatigue accidents”, depicts points that are considered what 
could be achieved if the 13 percent of fatigue related accidents did not occur.  In all cases, the 
Ohio extrapolated point for the US indicates safety was not lower than the US regression 
point. 
Figure 20 HOS Analysis on Property Damage Accidents Involving Trucksillustrates 
the example of property damage accidents involving trucks discussed in the previous 
paragraph.  This figure highlights the close nature of three of the four estimates: predicted 
estimate if no HOS change occurred, FMSCA’s prediction estimate on the reduction of 
accidents due to the change of HOS, and the Ohio extrapolated estimate.  This is important to 
note because it shows that the Ohio extrapolated point increased accidents in the US by a 
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marginal amount and not decreased them by the marginal amount predicted.  Comparing 
these three estimates to the possible 13 percent reduction that are currently attributed to 
fatigue visually shows that this rule was minimally predicted to reduce fatigue related 
accidents among truck drivers.   
 
  
*Data obtained from DoT website for fatalities during years 2002-2012, on June 7, 2014 
Table 17 HOS Analysis 
US  Regression 
Estimate 
US Regression Estimate 
Reduced by FMSCA 
Prediction (19 Lives, 560 
Injuries, 1,400 Property 
Damage)
Ohio Extrapolated Point 
on US Acidents Involving 
Trucks
US Regression 
Estimate 
Reduced by 
13% Fatigue 
Accidents
Fatalities Involving Trucks 3249 3230 (-.58%) 3263 (+.43%) 2827 (-13%)
Injuries Involving Trucks 72364 71804 (-.77%) 75826(+4.78%) 62956 (-13%)
Property Damage Involving Trucks 197473 196073 (-.71%) 199873 (+1.21%) 171801 (-13%)
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Table 18 further depicts the magnitude of FMSCA’s predictions on reducing fatigue-
caused accidents among truck drivers.  As previously stated, FMSCA predicted HOS would 
reduce US truck-related fatalities by 19, injuries by 560, and crashes by 1,400.  When 
compared to the aggregate number of US truck-related accidents, the FMSCA predictions 
amounts to approximately .5 percent reduction of deaths, injuries, or property damage 
Figure 20 HOS Analysis on Property Damage Accidents Involving Trucks 
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involving trucks.  Utilizing the 13 percent of fatigued-caused accidents and the DoT data 
from 2012 indicates that truck driver fatigue accounted for 510 fatalities, 13,520 injuries, and 
32,890 accidents involving property damage.  Reducing these numbers by the predicted 
FMSCA predictions results in 491 fatalities (a 3.7 percent reduction), 12,960 injuries (a 4.1 
percent reduction) and 31,490 (a 4.3 percent reduction).  
Eliminating an Alternative Explanation 
To avoid drawing the wrong conclusions about the impact of HOS on driver safety, it 
is important to demonstrate that changes to the frequency of accidents are not the result of an 
increase or decrease in vehicles on the road.  Although there is no data to show how many 
vehicles are on all the roads, it is possible to estimate the amount of vehicles driving by 
comparing the amount of gasoline and diesel gallons taxed and validating the estimate using 
turnpike traffic.  Figure 21 depicts the number of gallons taxed from July 2009 through June 
2014 for the state of Ohio.  During this period, gas purchases decreased by a mere 0.35 
percent while diesel purchases increased by 0.64 percent, and total gallons of fuel purchased 
increased by only 0.29 percent over the entire 60-month time period.  Similarly, vehicles on 
the turnpike followed consistent yearly patterns during these 60 months, as depicted in Figure 
3.  The majority of vehicles on the road are class 1 (low two-axle) followed by class 5 (high 
Table 18 FMSCA’s Predicted Fatigue Based on HOS Implementation 
Column A B C D E F
FMSCA (2013) 
Predicted Change 
Due to HOS
DOT Data (2012) % Change FMSCA (2013) 
Incidents Caused 
by Fatigue (13%)
Predicted 
Reduced Driver 
Fatigue Incidents
HOS Change on 
Fatigue
Deaths 19 3921 0.48% 510 12.52% 3.7%
Injuries 560 104000 0.54% 13,520 12.46% 4.1%
Property Damage 1400 253000 0.55% 32,890 12.45% 4.3%
*Formula =A/B =13%*B =D-A =A/D
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5-axle).  The peaks (summer) and lows (winter) are the changes in traffic flow that occurs 
throughout the calendar year. 
When combined, these two classes of vehicles account for 94.5 percent of all 
vehicles.  Over the 60-month time period, vehicle traffic on the Ohio Turnpike changed by 
the following amounts: 0.01 percent decrease in class 1, 0.05 percent increase in class 5, and 
0.03 percent increase in all classes.  The Ohio Turnpike data reveals that all classes of traffic 
changed by a rate corresponding with fuel taxes.  Both figures have highs and lows that 
indicate the seasonality of driving, which is captured in the analysis by ensuring the same 
months (July-June) of the given year remains constant. 
Since both figures show that there were only negligible changes to vehicle traffic 
between the various 12-month periods and the use of fuel in Ohio, overall changes in traffic 
were ruled out as a potential cause of the changes in truck-related accidents and no 
adjustments were made to account for them as part of the analysis. 
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Figure 21 Ohio Million Fuel Gallons Taxed 2009-2014 
Figure 22 Vehicles on Ohio Turnpike 2009-2014 
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Discussion 
 Comparing the accidents involving truck drivers prior to the 1 restart per 168 hour 
restriction and the 1 am to 5 am provision to the accidents after the HOS changes indicated a 
significant difference for both injuries and property damage.  This analysis showed that pre-
HOS injuries caused by or involving truck drivers (both <.001) and property damage caused 
by or involving truck drivers (<.001 and .007 respectively) were significantly lower than post 
HOS accidents of the same type (See Table 10 and Table 11).  However, the difference in 
fatalities caused by (p = .589) or involving truck drivers (p-value = .309) were not 
significant.  At first glance, it is possible to think that the HOS change significantly reduced 
the accidents involving truck drivers.  However, the significance does not appear to be the 
result of the HOS change but rather the steady downward trend of accidents that is 
continually occurring. 
 The trend of accidents involving trucks, as annotated in the literature review, has been 
on a continuous decline.  This decline is also revealed in the test results shown in Table 13 
and Table 14.  These tables generally indicated that the reference year is most similar to the 
most recent contrasted year.  For example, in Table 13, the Least Square Difference (LSD) 
between July 2013-June 2014 and the 2012-2013 year had a mean difference of -10.92 (p-
value =.518) for injuries involving trucks and a -3.080 (p-value=.744) for injuries caused by 
trucks.  As the contrasted year becomes further away with respect to time the mean 
difference tends to grown and the p-values become significant: indicating a downward trend 
for this type of accident. 
Comparing the pre- and the post- HOS data significant differences were found, 
possibly implying that the HOS changes reduced accidents involving truck drivers.  
 
132 
 
However, the general decreasing trend of the number of accidents involving trucks were 
driving the differences and not the HOS regulatory changes.  In order to more accurately 
account for this general downward trend, the percentage of accidents caused by truck drivers 
were analyzed, and the pre-HOS group was divided into four separate years and reanalyzed. 
The percent of accidents caused by truck drivers are very different than the number of 
accidents caused or involving trucks.  The percentage of accidents caused by truck drivers 
should theoretically change when new safety technologies, improvements in training, or 
beneficial regulations emerge, which only effects truck drivers.  Although not significant, 
this research found that the percent of truck drivers at fault increased in all three categories: 
fatal from 28.28 percent to 36.72 percent (p-value=.114), injury 52.04 percent to 54.46 
percent (p-value=.113), and property damage from 58.63 percent to 60.92 percent (p-
value=.247).  This percentage increase of truck drivers at fault suggests that the HOS revision 
was not beneficial to the safety of truck drivers and motorists on roads with truck drivers. 
 Separating the pre-HOS into four separate years on the number of accidents 
involving and caused by truck drivers indicated no significance difference between the year 
the 1 restart per 168 hour restriction and the 1 am to 5 am provision was in place to the 
previous year (see Table 13Table 14).  This suggests that the number of accidents were 
neither increased nor decreased to a significant level due to the HOS change. 
Upon further testing the percent of truck drivers at fault for fatalities, injuries, and 
property damage accidents by separating the pre-HOS into four years yielded interesting 
results.  First, there was a significant difference (increase) in the percent of truck drivers 
causing fatalities during the 1 restart per 168 hours restriction and 1 am to 5 am provision 
from the previous year not under this regulation (p-value=.026 see Table 16).  Although this 
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same percent was higher than the other contrasted years, it was not at a significant level.  The 
percent of injuries and property damage caused by truck drivers was also at its highest during 
the 1 restart per 168 hours and 1 am to 5 am HOS regulation period, but it was not at a 
significant level (with p-values ranging from .069 to .681 see Table 16). 
Extrapolating the HOS impact on accidents involving trucks from Ohio to the US 
revealed that the accidents for fatalities, injuries, and property damage all were above the 
regressed estimate for that time period (see Table 17).  This suggests that HOS may not have 
reduced fatigue related accidents as FMSCA projected. 
This research is unable to determine if the HOS change resulted in the reduction of 19 
fatalities, 560 injuries, and 1,400 property damage accidents involving trucks.  This is in 
large part due to the very small percentage of accidents that occur annually in the US 
involving trucks. As demonstrated in the analysis, 13 percent of accidents involving truck 
drivers have been attributed to fatigue.  This 13 percent translates to 510 fatalities, 13,520 
injuries, and 32,890 property damage accidents in the US for 2012 (see Table 18).  FMSCA 
predicted that HOS would reduce by 4 percent the number of accidents caused by fatigued 
truck drivers and reduce by approximately .5 percent the number of total accidents involving 
trucks (see Table 18).  Although these reductions are not inconsequential, HOS does not 
address the other 96 percent of accidents caused by fatigued truck drivers.  Given the cost 
and challenges of implementing HOS, addressing only 4 percent is problematic and further 
research is needed to provide greater results in the reduction of truck driver accidents due to 
fatigue. 
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Conclusions and Implications 
There are many important managerial findings from this research: 1) significant 
differences exist between pre- and post-HOS regarding the number of injuries, and property 
damage accidents involved and caused by truck drivers but not for fatalities, 2) recent HOS 
changes (1 restart per 168-hours restriction and 1 am to 5 am provision) did not significantly 
change the continuing downward trend of accidents involving trucks, 3) when analyzed using 
12-month periods, post-HOS number of accidents involving or caused by truck drivers is not 
significantly different than the prior 12 months in any category, 4) percent of accidents 
caused by truck drivers from July 2013 to June 2014 increased for fatalities, injuries and 
property damage accidents (p-values between 0.113 and 0.247), suggesting that the HOS 
changes (1 restart per 168 hours restriction and the 1 am to 5 am provision) made truck 
drivers more likely to be at fault for the accident than the period of July 2009 to June 2013, 
which was prior to the change; also, the percent of fatalities caused by truck drivers was 
significantly higher (p-value = .026) than the previous year, which was not regulated by the 1 
restart per 168 hour restriction and the 1 am to 5 am provision, and 5) the regression analysis 
and point estimates show that the US fatalities for the period of July 2013 to June of 2014 (1 
restart per 168 hour restriction and the 1 am to 5 am provision) are slightly above the trend 
line of accidents in the US.  Additionally, this research brings to light the small predicted 
impact that FMSCA claims HOS will have on fatigued truck drivers; showing that this 
regulation change in HOS was predicted to reduce all accidents involving trucks by less than 
1 percent, and fatigue-caused accidents by approximately 4 percent. 
 Countering fatigue is a difficult, if not impossible, feat for legislators.  A “one-size” 
fits all approach of HOS will have numerous direct and indirect negative safety effects that 
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are difficult to predict.  This research has shown that HOS has not decreased the percentage 
of accidents caused by truck drivers in the state of Ohio.  Furthermore, the rate at which 
accidents had previously been decreasing due to other factors did not significantly change 
because of the restart restrictions introduced into HOS. 
Enacting new HOS regulations came at a great expense to the individuals, the 
industry, and ultimately the consumer.  In fact, Short (2013) found that 66.3 percent of truck 
drivers surveyed were more fatigued and 27.8 percent were much more fatigued due to the 
updated HOS restart restrictions.  Not only were truck drivers reporting that they were more 
fatigued, but daytime traffic congestion has also increased due to HOS requirements, making 
roads less safe (Montague 2014; Short & Murray 2014; Downs 1992; Chen et al. 2015) 
Better enforcement of other regulations may be a more effective and cheaper 
alternative to HOS implementation.  For example Craft and Blower (2004) demonstrated that 
29 percent of accidents caused by trucks were the result of brake problems on trucks and that 
fatigue ranked seventh in terms of risk importance.  Improved trucking compliance on brake 
safety could have more than double the impact of attempting to counter fatigue.  The bottom 
line, is when legislation is passed that has questionable effects, more research should be 
accomplished prior to its implementation. 
Accidents are a terrible tragedy.  There are many reasons why accidents occur.  
Government HOS regulations need to be well researched prior to implementation.  With 
respect to the 1 restart per 168 hours restriction and 1 am to 5 am provision, thorough 
research was not completed until 1 year after the enactment of the rule (Ferro 2014).  The 
eventual suspension of these provisions indicates the very real possibility of some unintended 
consequences this HOS regulation may have had on truck drivers and motorists.  This 
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research has shown that truck drivers within Ohio are not causing a smaller percentage of 
fatalities, injuries, or property damage, the exact opposite of the intent of HOS. 
Future Research 
The data from Ohio is only a sample.  Once data is available at the national level, it 
too should be explored to better understand the HOS effects on truck driver and overall 
motorist’s safety.  Additional analysis should be conducted on other possible causal factors 
that affect safety that may not be tracked or apparent at this time.  For example, high driver 
turnover may have resulted from the HOS regulation, and high driver turnover has been 
shown to increase accidents due to a decrease in route familiarity and schedule (Staplin & 
Gish 2005; Griffin et al. 1992) 
Further studies should examine how other career fields are mitigating fatigue and 
reducing accidents.  For example, the medical field has made numerous improvements to 
handle fatigue (i.e., ER doctor and staff shifts), while the airline industry has reduced pilot 
fatigue.  The effort of these industries has a lot to offer the trucking industry through 
benchmarking.  
Further research is needed on countering fatigue among truck drivers.  Rather than 
dealing with actual numbers of accidents, research focusing on percentages will yield fewer 
confounding results by ruling out changes driven by market force innovations that equally 
affect truck drivers and other motorists.  Additional research can also be conducted by 
expanding the timeframe to the entire period that the 1 restart per 168 hours and 1 am to 5 am 
provision was in place, providing greater numbers and clarity to its impact on truck drivers’ 
safety. 
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VI. Conclusions and Recommendations 
 This chapter presents the main findings from this research.  Implications and 
recommendations are then provided based on the conclusions of this research.  This section 
will also address specific implications to the Air Force. 
Research Conclusions and Air Force Implications 
 The first research objective was to discover if HOS regulation was different from the 
other safety regulations examined.  A typology construct was created to classify these 
regulations and to examine the differences in the types of regulations.  HOS regulation was 
found to be the only safety regulation studies as the objective-indirect type.  No regulations 
studied moved from direct to indirect or indirect to direct, but since the majority of 
regulations are classified as direct it would seem that this type of regulation is preferred.  
Since HOS is regulating a factor related to fatigue but not fatigue itself, it makes more sense 
why this regulation is continually changed.  This regulation substantially changed on average 
every 7.09 years.  This was statistically more frequent than changes to subjective-direct (p 
value .003) policy type.  In the event that a technology came out that could measure driver-
fatigue, hours of service regulation may become direct.  Until that time, it is very likely that 
more HOS regulatory reform will continue in an attempt to indirectly regulate fatigue. 
The other regulations that were examined primarily started as subjective-direct and 
ended as objective-direct.  If a change occurred, subjective-direct regulation types moved to 
objective-direct 28.5 percent of the time, and only moved back 3 percent of the time (due to a 
unique situation); leading to 7 of the 11 initially subjective-direct type ending as an objective-
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direct type.  This implies that objective regulations seem to be preferred to subjective 
regulations.  
This typology was also empirically tested and significant differences were found 
among the various types.  Subjective-direct regulations types (19.67 years) changed 
significantly less frequently than objective-direct types (13.67 years) and objective-indirect 
types (7.09 years).  There was also a statistical difference among the size (characters, and 
sections) of the different types of regulation.  Of the three types classified in this research, all 
were significantly different (p-value <.0001).  Subjective regulations were the smallest, 
which could be explained by lack of regulation needed to describe intent rather than 
enforceable procedures.  The objective-indirect type was substantially larger than either 
objective-direct or subjective-direct types.  Since there are many indirect factors that 
contribute to the problem, indirect regulations may naturally grow in size to attempt to 
control these many factors.   
The implications of the second chapter are far-reaching due to the practical typology 
created.  Managers, legislators, and government agencies can benefit from understanding the 
different classifications while creating or modifying rules and regulations.  Creating only 
subjective rules may most likely lead to less control and ambiguous policies, while creating 
objective regulations may lead to greater control and clearer policies.  Indirect policies may 
lead to more changes over time and more complex regulations.  In creating rules and 
regulation it would appear that some initial subjectivity is needed to provide the intent and 
goal, while the majority of the regulation should seek to be objective to provide more legal 
clarity and to utilize emerging technologies. 
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This understanding of regulation types would benefit the Air Force and the entire 
DoD.  When writing or reviewing Air Force Instructions (AFIs), it is important to consider 
the instruction type.  If the instruction is direct or indirect and objective or subjective it will 
have varying levels of impact on Airmen.  Indirect instructions may most likely not solve the 
problem and may create unforeseen or unsafe situations.  This may occur since the AFI is 
attempting to control only an associated factor of the problem, leaving other factors with no 
instruction.  Direct instructions provide the safety needed for all Airmen, especially those 
who are less experienced and need guidelines in order to ensure their safety.  As previously 
stated, when a direct type of instruction is followed it provides guidance that leads to safer 
operations.  However, AFIs should also include some subjectivity.  This provides the overall 
goal of the instruction, which is beneficial when situations arise that are unique that are not 
specifically covered in the AFIs.  However, the majority of the instruction should be 
objective regulations that can be easily followed.  This will not only provide the overall goal 
but also the parameters necessary to ensure mission accomplishment and safety.   
The third chapter moved to further expand the knowledge with respect to the 
incentives provided to truck drivers through the lens of perishable inventory theory and its 
associated tactics.  The applied tactics in this research were capacity, flexibility, substitution 
and or elimination, FIFO or LIFO, heterogeneity, and planning.  This research found great 
capacity differences in the various HOS regulations based on the exhaustive enumeration 
method, which may result in less safety due to future investments and planning in the truck 
driving industry.  This research also found that restrictions limit the flexibility of truck 
drivers, which has unintended consequences such as increased congestion, or avoiding 
resting when tired; both of which have major safety implications.  Additionally, this research 
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showed how capacity could be increased through daily and weekly schedule changes, which, 
based upon the heterogeneity capability of the truck driver, may have negative safety 
implications.  Further complicating these tactics of perishability are the frequent HOS 
changes, which further destabilize the industry.  Analyzing HOS through the exhaustive 
enumeration technique and viewing the HOS regulatory constantly changing regulations 
through the lens of perishable inventory theory, HOS regulations have some major negative 
safety implications to truck drivers currently and to the truck driving industry in the future.  
Future unintended consequences can be avoided by following this researches approach and 
method prior to implementation of future regulations.  
The Air Force may be able to manage Airmen based on the tactics of perishable 
inventory theory.  For example, the Air Force attempts to manage fatigue like FMSCA by 
limiting the hours a pilot can be on duty.  There are 24-hour period, 7-day period, 30-day 
period, and 90-day period restrictions on the amount of hours a pilot can operate.  Different 
types of aircrafts have different rules (single seat versus crew aircraft).  For example, pilots 
in two different crew aircraft (C-130 and the KC-135) experience the same flight hour 
restrictions, but very different fatigue levels.  The KC-135 refueled other aircraft, making the 
mission much less stressful because it entailed a takeoff, orbit, multiple refueling, and a 
landing.  Although there may be eight flight hours (the value used in the 24-, 7-, 30-, and 90-
day restrictions) accumulated in a 12-hour duty day, it was not as fatiguing as the C-130 
mission.  In a C-130 mission, there were multiple combat takeoffs (wearing of helmets and 
protective armor), combat landings, unloadings, reconfigurations, and reloadings.  In a 
similar 12-hour duty day a pilot may only achieve 5 hours of flying.  Since the limitations are 
based on flight time, it would appear that the pilots of the KC-135 would be much more 
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fatigued than the pilots of the C-130.  However, this is not the experience of many pilots.  
Fatigue is much more complicated than just the flight hours recorded.  McClelland’s research 
(2013) also drew the same conclusion, which he found that flight time is not the right 
approach to understanding fatigue.   
Reevaluating how the Air Force manages people with respect to fatigue is a 
complicated and incredibly important issue.  Given that Airmen operate expensive 
equipment, performing risky operations, and can have large impacts on international 
relations; it is critical that they are not fatigued while performing these duties.  This research 
has shown that indirect measures, such as flight-time, can lead to operators being in 
compliance, but still failing by being fatigued.   
The fourth chapter researched the safety efficacy of the recent HOS change.  The 
research in this chapter found: 1) Significant differences exist between pre- and post-HOS 
regarding the number of injuries, and property damage accidents involved and caused by 
truck drivers but not for fatalities, 2) Recent HOS changes (1 restart per 168-hours restriction 
and 1 am to 5 am provision) did not significantly change the continuing downward trend of 
accidents involving trucks, 3) When analyzed using 12-month periods, post-HOS number of 
accidents involving or caused by truck drivers is not significantly different than the prior 12 
months in any category, 4) Percent of accidents caused by truck drivers from July 2013 to 
June 2014 increased for fatalities, injuries and property damage accidents (p-values between 
0.113 and 0.247), suggesting that the HOS changes (1 restart per 168 hours restriction and 
the 1 am to 5 am provision) made truck drivers more likely to be at fault for the accident than 
the period of July 2009 to June 2013, which was prior to the change; also, the percent of 
fatalities caused by truck drivers was significantly higher (p-value = .026) than the previous 
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year, which was not regulated by the 1 restart per 168 hour restriction and the 1 am to 5 am 
provision, 5) The regression analysis and point estimates show that the US fatalities for the 
period of July 2013 to June of 2014 (1 restart per 168 hour restriction and the 1 am to 5 am 
provision) are slightly above the trend line of accidents in the US.  Additionally, this research 
highlighted the small predicted impact that FMSCA claims HOS will have on fatigued truck 
drivers; showing that this regulation change in HOS was predicted to reduce all accidents 
involving trucks by less than 1 percent, and fatigue-caused accidents by approximately 4 
percent. 
The Air Force could gain insight from this research by conducting similar types of 
analysis on safety outcomes in aircraft when the AFIs change or when there are waivers.  For 
example, the Air Force waived the 30-day flight-time to allow more flight hours during 
Operation Iraqi and Operation Enduring Freedom.  The safety results before and after this 
waiver was implemented, would provide information to the Air Force regarding this flight 
duty period restriction as well as the sensitivity to changing these hours and associated safety 
implications.  Variables such as mishaps (class a-d), and in-flight emergencies should be 
analyzed before and after the flight-time waiver was established.  Additional research should 
examine the safety differences between aircrafts and jobs based on factors that are related to 
fatigue, which may not be addressed in the AFIs. 
Summary 
The Air Force relies on the truck industry to deliver the logistical capabilities to ports, 
airfields, and rail-stations in order to deliver the needed resources to those in combat.  
Restricting the capability of truck drivers will also restrict the capability of delivering this 
logistical capability to our Airmen in combat.  Furthermore, the Air Force is dependent on 
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funding that is generated by the economy, which is largely reliant on the fiscal health of the 
trucking industry.  Therefore, a weak truck industry will have negative impacts to the 
economy, which means a weaker Air Force.  
Countering fatigue indirectly is a difficult, if not impossible, feat for legislators.  
Attempting to regulate fatigue indirectly will lead to a continually changing regulatory 
environment that will have consequences on the trucking industry, the supply chain, and the 
economy.  The trucking industry will continually adjust the number of drivers and associated 
support structure in order to provide a certain service level.  These changes may have 
negative safety implications and the supply chain will have to adapt to changing delivery 
times and number of warehouses.  The economy, given that 1 in 15 people work in the 
trucking industry (All Trucking 2016), will be impacted by these regulatory changes, which 
is why it is critical to get it right. 
This research provides more insight on how to get HOS regulation to offer more 
safety to truck drivers and motorists.  It is important that this regulation is directly measuring 
its intended goal—fatigue.  Moreover, by measuring fatigue instead of hours of operation, the 
many different unintended consequences (safety and economically), which this research 
found, may be avoided.   
Future Research 
Given the new regulation typology proposed by this research, there is a plethora of 
future research needed to either further substantiate it or find its weaknesses in different 
fields.  Additional research can be conducted on different characteristics of the types 
discussed in this research.  Some of these include the efficacy of the regulation or rule to see 
which regulations tend to provide better results regarding their intended objective.  Other 
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characteristics such as cost could be explored in order to provide a better cost-benefit of 
different regulation types. 
Truck drivers could and should be asked directly about these perishability concepts 
and tactics in future research.  Surveys analyzing truck companies and drivers, pre and post 
HOS changes, with respect to the concepts of perishable inventory theory could establish 
greater credibility for the theoretical foundation presented in this research.  Such research 
would provide greater insight into and evidence of the actual safety implications of the 
current regulatory environment. 
Additional research is needed in coalescing regulators and truck industry experts with 
respect to safety as part of the field of managerial controls (Miller & Saldanha 2013) and in 
order to ensure wiser regulatory policies (Breyer 1986).  Moreover, future research should 
look at directly measuring driver fatigue, through technologies such as the “sleepalyzer” 
(Williams et al. 2012, p.120), so that those direct measurements can be used to develop direct 
regulations, instead of indirect regulations that hope fatigued driving does not occur. 
The data from Ohio is only a sample.  Once data is available at the national level, it 
too should be explored to better understand the HOS effects on truck driver and overall 
motorist’s safety.  Additional analysis should be conducted on other possible causal factors 
that affect safety that may not be tracked or apparent at this time.  For example, high driver 
turnover may have resulted from the HOS regulation, and high driver turnover has been 
shown to increase accidents due to a decrease in route familiarity and schedule (Staplin & 
Gish 2005; Griffin et al. 1992) 
Further studies should examine how other career fields are mitigating fatigue and 
reducing accidents.  For example, the medical field has made numerous improvements to 
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handle fatigue (i.e., ER doctor and staff shifts), while the airline industry has reduced pilot 
fatigue.  The effort of these industries has a lot to offer the trucking industry through 
benchmarking.  
Further research is needed on countering fatigue among truck drivers.  Rather than 
dealing with actual numbers of accidents, research focusing on percentages will yield fewer 
confounding results by ruling out changes driven by market force innovations that equally 
affect truck drivers and other motorists.  Additional research can also be conducted by 
expanding the timeframe to the entire period that the 1 restart per 168 hours and 1 am to 5 am 
provision was in place, providing greater numbers and clarity to its impact on truck drivers’ 
safety. 
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